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1. ABSTRACT  
This project examines how the Amazigh movements of Morocco use their culture as a resource to 
gain political influence. The empirical data has been collected in Rabat in March 2016 through a 
field study that includes participatory observations and two qualitative interviews involving 
several political activists. The data material will be analyzed mainly with help from Hylland 
Eriksen’s book “Ethnicity and Nationalism” and supplemented by the terms tactics and strategies 
as defined by Michel de Certeau. Furthermore, we use the research of scholars who have done 
similar work on the Amazigh movements and culture.  
Our studies indicate that The Amazigh movement face problems related to being a 
marginalized minority. They suffer under an arabization process as well as both segregation and 
assimilation from an oppressing government. This is why they fight for universalized values such 
as secularism, gender equality, human rights and democracy, the latter standing out as the 
paramount objective of their struggle. 
The Amazigh activists we interviewed use a wide variety of cultural tools to fight for these 
ideals. For example, they use the historical background of their people to create a narrative that 
highlights certain aspects of the past. This narrative helps to claim these universalized principles 
and link them to their cultural identity. Also, they speak their native language publicly to gain 
visibility, educate and raise awareness with the aim of gaining recognition from international 
authorities. Media such as TV, radio and the internet, especially in terms of social media are also 
effective tools to promote their cause. In conclusion, we found that the Amazigh activists used 
their culture in many different ways to reach their political goals.  
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2. INTRODUCTION  
For thousands of years the Northern parts of Africa have been inhabited by the Amazigh people. 
The recent centuries’ globalisation process has led European and Arab colonizers to Africa and in 
consequence, geographical borders have been drawn up. Like this, the Amazigh people have been 
marginalized into a minority and in some areas they suffer under oppressive Arab governments.  
However, the Arab spring in 2010 has stirred the situation and in some areas the conditions of the 
Amazigh people are starting to change. One of those places is the Kingdom of Morocco in 
Northwestern Africa. Movements, as well as individual activists, are on the rise and the Amazigh 
population has already experienced some cultural acknowledgement.  
Inspired by these changes, this project will deal with the political struggle of the Amazigh 
minority of Morocco.  
 
 
3. PROBLEM FIELD 
We will now outline the scientific relevance of our research area and outline our interests as well 
as the motivations for producing this project. Furthermore, this section will contain an 
argumentation of the relevance of our problem formulation and introduce the focus of the project.  
Our field of research is based on an interest in the cultural identity of the ethnic group 
commonly known as Berbers or as some of them prefer to be called Amazigh (in plural 
Imazighen). In the last decades scholars like Paul A. Silverstein, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and 
Cleo Jay have done research in areas such as the arabization of Moroccan society, the rise of the 
Amazigh identity movement, radicalisation and indigenous identities in a transnational 
perspective. Our project will aim to incorporate and elongate the knowledge generated by these 
authors. Maddy-Weitzman wrote in 2015:  
“In recent years, however, a modern Amazigh (literally: ‘free man’) identity movement 
has emerged with a concrete and symbolic agenda that poses fundamental challenges to 
North African states and societies” (Maddy-Weitzman 2015: p. 2499). 
It is this strive for recognition that caught our interest. After the Arab Spring the power relations 
of some areas in North Africa are still unclear, especially in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and 
Morocco. Maddy-Weitzman argues that the event of the Arab Spring contains an important 
Amazigh dimension which helps them to enter a new area of activism. In his article, “A turning 
point? The Arab Spring and the Amazigh movement” Maddy- Weitzman wrote:  
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“The Amazigh element was very much part of the initial protests in early 2011. Following 
the tactics that worked so well in Tunis and Cairo, Morocco’s Internet-savvy, mostly 
politically unaffiliated twenty-something generation created Facebook groups protesting 
the political elite’s endemic corruption and calling for political reform, encapsulated in 
the popular slogan ‘parliamentary monarchy’” (Maddy-Weitzman 2015: p. 2502).  
As a result, Amazigh activist movements are rising up and they protest against the hegemonic 
favorisation of Arabs and Islamic values and the oppression of their linguistic and cultural rights 
(Maddy-Weitzman 2012: p 109). In connection to this, they are also protesting the very name 
“Arab spring” as it works as an exclusionary mechanism as it excludes them by not mentioning 
the Amazigh participation. Our interest in the subject is centered around the cultural identity of 
the Amazigh movement and how they use their identity in the new era of activism as well as in 
the political debate.  Furthermore, a motivation for producing this project is that we discovered 
that the issues of the Amazigh movements of Morocco have yet to be approached in the 
qualitative way that we wish to examine it by. We found that there is relatively little diversity in 
research of the aforementioned scholars and that it is difficult to find information about the local 
groups and the activists that we wish to investigate. Therefore, travelling to the foreign field and 
generating our own data is relevant and it provides us with another motivational factor as we all 
have personal interests in gaining the experience of trying to conduct data in a foreign field. 
Our project will investigate how the Amazigh activists use their culture as a resource in 
reaching their political goals. The data will be gathered in the Moroccan capital Rabat through 
participatory observations and qualitative interviews. 
 
Problem Formulation 
How does Amazigh activists use their culture as a resource in their political fight? 
 
3.1. Definition of terms 
Amazigh: Is the term we use to describe the ethnic group we research in this project. We will not 
use the term Berber as a name because there are negative associations connected to the term. 
Imazighen: Refers to the plural form of the word/term Amazigh. That means we use it as a way 
to state that there are more than one Amazigh person.  
Tamazight: Is the name of the language the Amazigh speak and write in.   
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Tamazgha: The vast geographical area which the Amazigh culture comes from, stretching across 
all of North Africa from the Atlantic Ocean all the way down to Senegal, Burkina Faso and 
Niger. 
Arabization: Refers to the Arab culture colonizing non-Arab area either by migration or direct 
conquest. 
Secularism: Is the administrative separation or division between religious and governmental 
affairs.  
Pan-Arabism: The idea of a union between all Arab states. Often associated with Arab 
nationalism. 
 
4. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The creation of the Amazigh identity has been developed for thousands of years, therefore we 
find it important to outline the historical background of the people. The following chapter will 
contain a brief description of the history of the Amazigh up until contemporary times, which will 
be explained in the following section.  
Around 5000 BC the ancestors of the Moroccan Imazighen, also called Imazighen, settled in 
the area of nowadays Morocco. Due to the harsh mediterranean climate with scarce vegetation 
and irregular rainfall there were often conflict over the resources. Therefore, there has been a 
need for an authoritative power to administer and organize these resources between the tribes. 
These positions have also been usurped by foreign colonizing powers such as Romans and 
Carthaginians. As a result, there have been many different cultures who have contributed to the 
history of the Amazigh people of North Africa (Overy 2015: pp. 94-95). Hence, as Maddy-
Weitzman suggests, the idea that Berbers should have an “essence” is passé today. Nevertheless, 
by tracing the indigenous people of North Africa  (preferred by the Imazighen to be referred to as 
Tamazgha (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 4)) we can somewhat draw a picture of an ethnicity, 
which has been under development for millenias (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 4-5). 
The early Amazigh population of Morocco were nomads from the nearby east who may have 
had an ethnic relation to the Egyptians. Around 2500 BC Saharan horse-breeders and 
Mediterranean anglers joined the former nomads. Later, around 800 BC Phoenicians merged with 
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the already settled groups and around 500 BC Africans from the east followed (Clammer 2014: p. 
409). 
When the Romans reached the land around 400 BC and discovered the unfamiliar diverse 
culture they named the natives “Berber” which referred to the word “Barbarians”. The word 
“Berber” was originally a condescending insult, but today the word has been transformed into a 
positive term by the Berber Pride Movement (Clammer 2014: p.409). 
The Romans tried to take over the area the Amazigh occupied in North Africa by forcefully 
implementing Roman culture and law. They were not overpowered by the Roman procedure, 
which had managed to control Byzantines and Vandals. By determinedly resisting to accept the 
Roman law the rebellious Imazighen freed themselves from Roman control after several hundred 
years (Clammer, 2014: pp. 409-411). 
Most of the Imazighen in Morocco were in the first part of the seventh century worshiping 
their own ancient gods, next to smaller groups of Jewish and Christian Imazighen (Clammer 
2014: p. 411). Arab caliphs spread across North Africa to mission Islam. When the Umayyad 
Arab leader Uqba bin Nafi and his army reached Morocco in 682, they were fought by the well-
known Algerian Amazigh Queen al-Kahina.  
The Queen al-Kahina’s fighters conquered Uqba and he was forced to retreat his army 
(Clammer 2014: p. 411). Even though Islam was not implemented in the Amazigh culture in 
North Africa by force, the religion was slowly being implemented in society and everyday life by 
persuasion. The Imazighen beliefs were fundamentally similar to Islamic values. 
Besides the moral principles the Imazighen would also attain the advantage of using the 
Umayyad trading routes if they shared religion. Therefore the Imazighen began to convert to 
Islam. The Umayyads had spread the Islamic belief mainly through nonviolent involvements in 
Morocco by the eighth century (Clammer 2014: p. 411).  
During the eighth century many religious groups, mostly Islamic, fought to gain power and 
during the so-called Kharijiti Revolt in 739 the Ummayad caliphate was overthrown and the 
Barghwata kingdom arose (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp.24-26). The Barghwata Kingdom was the 
largest dynasty of the many Amazigh confederations, which emerged in this period. As an 
opposition to the Islamic environment the Barghwata Kingdom unified the Imazighen under a 
culture that originated from the Musmada tribe and ruled for more than three hundred years in 
nowadays Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 26). To the Amazigh movements today: 
 “The Barghwata represents an authentic assertion of Berber identity like no other during 
the millennium of Islamic rule, a cultural reaction emanating from the desire for self-
preservation” (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 27). 
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The official history of Morocco has ignored this period of time as a blind spot in the story of the 
Arabization of North Africa, therefore the Amazigh movement stresses the necessity of 
rediscovering the era (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 27).  
In the middle of the eleventh century, following the Barghawata Kingdom an indigenously 
originated dynasty of Islamic Imazighen from the Sahara desert called the Almoravids arose. The 
new dynasty expanded across Gibraltar and gained control of Southern Spain. With the influence 
of Andalusian culture the era was influenced by unprecedented architectural and intellectual 
works, for example the famous palace Alhambra (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011: pp. 29-30).  
Only a hundred years later the Almoravids were replaced by the North African Almohads 
who were also represented by Islamic Imazighen. After the Almohads the Marinid Berber 
dynasty took over and by the end of the fifteenth century three great Islamic Amazigh dynasties 
had come to an end and separated into smaller kingdoms (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011: pp. 29-31). 
Through the Islamization of the Imazighen their historical heritage was partly erased and replaced 
with myths, which implied that Imazighen were of Arab origin (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 32-
34).  
In the sixteenth century the Ottomans came to rule most of the land in North Africa, except 
the sultanate of Morocco, which they did not have the ability to conquer (Maddy-Weitzman 
2011: p. 34). During the time of Ottomans ruling, Christian Europeans slowly began to interfere 
in North African matters. After three hundred years the Ottomans had to give up their control of 
North Africa to the French colonizers. In the nineteenth century the French gained control over 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Sahel (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 36-38). Even though the 
political French domination of Morocco was violent the country did not experience the worst 
parts of European colonization as many other countries in North Africa did. First, France 
implemented their economical system in Morocco and afterwards they seized administrative and 
military control of the country (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 50-52).  
In the late 1920s France dominated what they saw as the useful parts of Morocco. They 
only needed to gain control over the High and Middle Atlas mountains where Amazigh tribes still 
resisted the colonization. At this time the French imposed a law which gave the Imazighen rights 
to avoid the rules of Shari’a in legal cases. The law brought attention to the religious differences 
between Arabs and Imazighen. The French also used the Imazighen as “national signifiers”, in 
order to separate the two cultures. This was one of the factors that enforced an association 
between France and the Amazigh people (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 55-58).  
By 1934, when France fully dominated Morocco, around twenty seven thousand soldiers, 
mostly Imazighen, fighting for the French army had died alongside numerous of rebels who had 
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challenged the colonizers (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 50-51). However, both Imazighen and 
Arabs joined and planned one of the final and most important attacks in 1955 in the Taza region 
to liberate Morocco from French domination in order to regain independence (Maddy-Weitzman 
2011: p. 61).  
After, Morocco attained independence the Arab culture and language was inserted in 
society in order to unify the Moroccan people by a common national identity as Sunni Muslims. 
The Imazighen cultural and linguistic heritage was oppressed in order to unite the Moroccan 
people. On the one side, this approach caused a decline of Amazigh speakers, but on the other, it 
initiated awareness of the Imazighen cultural, historical and linguistic background. This situation 
lead to the formation of new social Amazigh movements and organizations. In parallel, in Algeria 
they experienced the same development as in Morocco, which lead to cultural repression 
(Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 65-66).  
In order to represent the rural areas in the country a political Amazigh party emerged in 
1959 called the Mouvement Populaire. With support from king Hassan II, the Mouvement 
Populaire prevented the anti-Amazigh party Istiqual from controlling the political scene (Maddy-
Weitzman 2011: p. 88). Yet, even though the Amazigh were represented in politics, their cultural 
and linguistic narrative were strongly neglected in the educational system. The history of 
Morocco was rewritten now with a strong focus on Islamic and the Arabic culture. Even 
Amazigh language, Tamazight,  was said to derive from Arabic (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 89-
90).  
As an early uprise to the cultural repression, intellectual activists formed the first Amazigh 
organization in Morocco in 1967 (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 95). Also, the issues concerning the 
repression of the Amazigh culture were brought up in political contexts during the 1970s. In the 
1980s a journal called “Amazigh” presented their issues to a larger part of the Moroccan people 
by publishing in both French and Arabic. The purpose with the journal was to declare that the 
Amazigh people would not tolerate that the state neglected of their culture in Moroccan history 
and the repression in society (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 97).  
In 1993, the Amazigh organizations gathered and founded one common association called 
the National Coordination Council who created a Charter with seven demands for cultural 
recognition (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 119). When in 1999 the throne was surpassed to King 
Hassan II’s son Mohamed VI the situation started to change for the Amazigh people. King 
Mohamed VI portrayed himself as “the King of the People” with a more modern way of ruling 
compared to his father (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 153).  
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Some of the demands from the National Coordination Council were meet in 2001 with two 
important initiatives. First, there was the “Berber Manifesto”, and second King Mohamed VI 
founded the “Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe” (IRCAM). The Manifesto is a long report 
which explains the project of Amazigh culture and identity, which contradicts large parts of the 
official  Moroccan history. In the end of the Manifesto there are nine requests which the 
authorities have to comply. The requests places Amazigh culture and linguistics alongside Arabic 
(Maddy-Weitzman 2011: pp. 161-163). 
 
4.1. Contemporary situation  
Continuing from the establishment of IRCAM, in 2001, many scholars as well as the activists that 
we met, agree that big changes have happened with the fight for cultural recognition. This 
beginning at the point of King Mohamed VI taking over the kingdom, after the death of his 
father, aforementioned, in 1999 (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 153). 
In the section prior, it was mentioned how several Amazigh organizations have been formed, 
going back since the early days of the 1960’s. The three main organisations include: AMREC, 
Tamaynut Assosiation, and AZETTA. Both AMREC and AZETTA were organisations, that we 
tried to get in contact with, though without success. However, these organisations have been 
credited with being the main introducers in getting Amazigh activists into the public and political 
debate in Morocco (Cornwell & Atia 2012: p. 264).  
The organisation going back the furthest is L’Association Marocaine de la Recherche et 
d’Échange Culturel - AMREC (in english, The Moroccan Association for Research and Cultural 
Exchange). The organisation was formed in 1967 to promote Amazigh culture in the field of 
research (Sadiqi, 2014: p. 16). It was the pioneer of organizing Amazigh activists, and many 
other organisations have strings and connections to AMREC. Tamaynut Assosiation (Tamaynut 
meaning new) was for example established by former AMREC members. They are active in 
global fight for human rights to indigenous people in general, and have received international 
recognition for their work. Lastly, AZETTA (Réseau Amazigh pour la Citoyenneté), the newest 
of the three, works through lobbying for cultural, economic and political rights for the people of 
Morocco. Their lobbying work is framed around democracy and secularism (Cornwell & Atia 
2012: p. 264). Genuine recognition and change for both language and culture has eventually first 
happened on a political level with the establishment of Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe 
(Sadiqi 2014: p. 18).  
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The establishment of IRCAM by King Mohamed VI effectively caused that Amazigh as a 
culture entangles again the society as it once did before, but now after the effects of the 
arabization. The institute was formed to carry out three tasks. They were to make research on the 
historical traces of Amazigh, elaborate and implement this knowledge  in the schools of Morocco 
and finally take management of general issues related to the Amazigh population (Sadiqi 2014: p. 
18). The success of the tasks carried out by the institute seem to vary, so there are different 
attitudes towards the outcome of IRCAM’s work, which will be elaborated in the section on 
political goals of the analysis.  
However, no one can deny that since the establishment of the institute, the amount of 
publications being made available to the public about Amazigh culture and language, have never 
been higher in numbers. Furthermore, IRCAM played an instrumental role in getting the 
language of Amazigh into the educational curriculum as now the Amazigh culture and Tamazight 
are taught at the entire primary-level of the school system. This is an aspect also happening at the 
universities of Morocco, where students have the opportunity to take linguistic and cultural 
courses (Sadiqi 2014: p. 19).  
The official recognition of Tamazight with the help of IRCAM has in fact changed the 
situation in Morocco for the Amazigh people. Many other North African countries have received 
this recognition with great optimism and envied the Moroccan society’s ability to change some of 
the structures caused by the arabization, which has resulted in the minorities now having the 
possibility to live out other identity aspects than Arab (Sadiqi 2014: p. 20).  
The effects on society include a change in Amazigh signs and alphabet appearing all around 
the cities of Morocco. Furthermore, the political sphere has changed in now having political 
parties that support the promotion of the Amazigh culture (Sadiqi 2014: p. 21). This has helped 
the uprising of activists and many new organisations with political agendas like the ones we 
encountered.  
Having presented the contemporary situation of the Amazigh people and their historical 
background we have now a thorough understanding of the people we interviewed. Following 
section will present the interviewed activists. 
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5. THEORY         
In this project we use Grounded Theory which means that we found the following part of the 
theory after we had gathered our data. We use Thomas Hylland Eriksen's book “Ethnicity and 
Nationalism” which contain definitions of terms that are relevant to incorporate in our project. 
For example, the terms of stereotyping, contrasting, matching and the concept of “Us & Them” 
will help us in our analysis. Also the framework of minorities and majority is important to 
understand for our research.  
According to Eriksen (2010) the theories of nationalism and anthropological theories of 
ethnicity are closely linked to one another. He stresses that both theories understand nationalism 
and ethnicity as socially constructed instead if being natural entities, as was the common belief in 
the 19th century. Thus, we understand Eriksen as part of a social-constructionist tradition.  
We will also explain the terms strategies and tactics defined by de Certeau, which we will use 
to look at the way the activists work in relation to the state. Therefore, in this section we will 
present the theoretical definitions which we will use in our dialectic work process. 
 
5.1. “Us and Them” 
In this part we will explain how stereotyping and contrasting can lead to a distinction between 
ethnic or cultural groups as being part of two different groups, “Us and Them”, and what the 
alternative of “We and You” imply.  
Stereotyping, as defined by Eriksen, is present in the world view of any person, as well as the 
activists we spoke to. We will later in the analysis visibilize how this process works and how 
stereotypes are expressed more or less unconsciously by the activists. 
People perceive each other through stereotypes in order to either define themselves or others. 
Stereotypes can work in different ways. For example, it can improve one’s own status in and as a 
group by claiming some sort of superiority or it can be used negatively by a dominating group to 
justify oppression. This is a process that helps shaping one's identity and to understand the world 
(Eriksen 2010: p. 22). According to Eriksen:  
“Stereotypes help the individuals to create order in an otherwise excruciatingly 
complicated social universe. They make it possible to divide the social world into kinds of 
people” (ibid.: pp. 29-30).  
In other words, he explains that stereotyping can give the individual the impression that he or she 
understands society. Stereotyping can also work as self-fulfilling prophecies, where a given 
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group fulfill the stereotype imposed on them (Eriksen 2010: p. 30). Moreover, stereotypes can 
have the potential to empower an oppressed group: 
 “Stereotypes can justify privileges and differences in access to a society’s resources. 
Conversely, negative stereotypes per directed towards a ruling group may alleviate 
feelings of powerlessness and resignation: they can be seen as the symbolic revenge of the 
downtrodden.” (ibid.).  
Stereotyping is part of a process possibly leading to a relation between groups called ‘Us and 
Them’ where identity is created by differentiating yourself from others. This means that you 
identify yourself from a perspective of, not only what you are, but what you are not; referring at 
the other ethnic group stating that, “we are what they are not”. Ethnicity is thus a product of 
contact between groups. As Eriksen's states:  
“The first fact of ethnicity is the application of systematic distinctions between insiders 
and outsiders; between Us and Them. If no such principle exists there can be no ethnicity, 
since ethnicity presupposes an institutionalised relationship between delineated categories 
whose members consider each other to be culturally distinctive.” (Eriksen 2010: p. 23).  
There are different definitions of the term “ethnicity”. Eriksen writes that ethnic groups generally 
have notions of common ancestry and shared culture while others regard e.g. shared religion or 
perceived endogamy as important factors (ibid.: p. 42). As the Amazigh people neither have a 
common religion nor perceived endogamy, we agree with the criticism of these criteria, and join 
in defining an ethnic group as including at least notions of common ancestry and shared culture. 
The Imazighen are in fact constructing a common ancestral identity by highlighting certain 
aspects in the past which we will come back to later in the project. Eriksen used an example with 
the Huron Indians presenting themselves to their surroundings as a, through history, oppressed 
people (ibid. p. 83). This is done by manipulating historical events and telling certain stories and 
downplaying others. As mentioned earlier, this is a tool used by all ethnic groups. The Imazighen 
definitely hold a shared culture consisting of for example literature, arts and music. As we will 
learn later in the analysis, and as Eriksen points out, to the individual, ethnicity can both give 
meaning and a way to organize in groups to work for common cultural interests (Eriksen 2010: p. 
23).  
We understand identity as how an individual perceives him/herself and that can either be a 
feeling of “belonging to” or be “different from”. In the creation of an ethnic group an exclusion 
takes place and then, some belong and some do not. 
That leaves the Amazigh people as often defining themselves as an ethnic group that is 
different from the Arab ethnicity. The problem in this for them is that being a Morroccan is 
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officially being an Arab. They learn Arabic in school and in the public institutions Arabic or 
French is spoken. People with an Amazigh identity are therefore being excluded from the 
common understanding of a Moroccan citizen. However, the activists argue that many Imazighen 
do not know that they are in fact Amazigh. They have lost their culture (Appendix 2: ll. 89-91). 
This is a classic argument for nationalist movements; that a people may forget that it is a people. 
These lost Imazighen are thus claimed to have been acculturated and assimilated into Arab 
culture as a result of the politics of arabization (Eriksen 2010: p. 24).  
Ethnicity is created in contact between different groups, but not only by defining against the other 
group or creating a “Us and Them” dichotomy. There is also an aspect of shared cultural 
repertoire which can be closely intertwined with negative stereotyping (ibid. p. 28). Eriksen 
argues that “[...] both aspects are probably necessary components of a stable system of interethnic 
relations.” There is a contact between ethnic groups which may result in an increasing similarity 
when at the same time the groups tend to focus on their differences (ibid.: p. 23). This process of 
differentiation is called contrasting by Eriksen, and it often results in a “Us and Them” view on 
the society.  
Another way for ethnic groups to perceive and understand each other is through a process 
called matching (ibid.: p. 34). Matching involves considering the cultural differences between 
groups as a matter of fact, and often as an advantage. This process sometimes leads to a different 
way of viewing relations between ethnic groups which Eriksen calls “a We-You kind of process” 
(ibid.). However, matching can be used by governing powers to justify oppression, e.g. by saying, 
this minority is “in fact” better than the majority at manual labor. On the other hand, matching 
can also be used by the minority to obtain a base on which to argue with the majority on. This 
base is an ideology of complementarity, i.e. they say: “We are different from you, and that is a 
good thing”. In this way a minority can argue for their distinctive identity and for them having 
rights. When there is a lack of complementarity in society a tendency towards assimilation is 
present. We will explain about assimilation in detail in the next section. In the analysis we will 
examine how the processes of contrasting and matching work in relation to the Amazigh. In the 
next section, we will explain the framework and relation between minority and majority groups. 
 
5.2. Majority and minority 
A minority is usually defined as an ethnic group of inferior numbers than the majority, but this is 
not always the case. The framework of minorities and majority can also be more of a matter of 
who has the power to define (Eriksen 2010: p. 121). For example, in our case the Amazigh is 
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considered as a minority, both by themselves and by the nation-state, even though they make up a 
large part of the Moroccan population (Maddy-Weitzman 2006: p. 72).  
The term minority is therefore always spoken of as relational to the majority and vice versa. 
The relation between the two is often divided by boundaries that are set by the state who 
represents the majority. The three strategies that are often used by the majority are: assimilation, 
segregation and multiculturalism. What Eriksen mentions is that the power the majority uses one 
or several of these strategies when dealing with minority issues (Eriksen 2010: p. 149). The three 
will be now be explained in detail below. 
What assimilation means is that the majority may seek to insist on minorities giving up their 
indigenous language along with their cultural characteristics. This entails that the minority 
gradually becomes part of the majority. Meaning that the ideals of a successful assimilation 
policy ultimately leads to the disappearance of the minority (ibid.). 
Assimilation should entail an improvement on their social standing, however, giving up on 
cultural aspects of life often implies a great suffering and the loss of cultural values and dignity. 
A majority often classifies this strategy as a way to help the minority to achieve equal rights on 
the same footing as the majority (ibid.). 
Another strategy the state can use when seeking to dominate the ethnic minorities more 
progressively could be segregating them physically. For example, by creating areas of lower 
social status like ghettos and thus isolating the minority from the majority. This is done by the 
power majority in their forming and choosing of which specific areas should be updated through 
the building of infrastructure and educational sites. The strategy involves a power asymmetry, 
however, it does not always involve the results of state policies but can be caused by a 
combination of both class differences following ethnic and minority stigmas (Eriksen 2010: pp. 
149-150). 
The third and final strategy can be found in the state claiming the country to consist of 
different ethnic nationalist ideologies, and thereby, opting on being a country of multiculturalism. 
It is an ideology where citizenship and civil rights are compatible with the several ethnic or 
religious identities of that given country. This meaning a decentralization of the federal system, 
that should provide the entirety of the population with a high level of local autonomy, in for 
example education, infrastructure, hospitals and so on (Eriksen 2010: pp. 149-150).   
In relation to the three strategies mentioned above the minority has three ways of responding 
to the state domination. (Eriksen 2010: p. 150). 
The first option has the same consequences of an assimilation process. More often than not 
this has been a very common process, however, not always in an active choice by the minority.  
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The state may try to assimilate the different ethnic groups themselves as mentioned prior. 
(Eriksen 2010: p. 150). This are some of the effects seen in the United States where the black 
population has become assimilated, but they did not have the opportunity to choose voluntarily 
whether to be assimilated or not.  In the United States the population is characteristized by having 
different skin colours and therefore the black population has automatically been categorized as 
Americans.  
This aspect may not seem very relevant in relation to our field of research, but it says 
something about the minority–majority relations and shows that assimilation can not be 
understood as something only voluntary. A minority can become a part of this ethnic 
classification without having the possibility of declining (ibid.).  
The second principle is found in those minorities that deny or were denied access to the 
process of assimilation. These minorities might actively try to resist the assimilation by reacting 
through the incorporation of their ethnicity, only in such a way that they are subordinate to the 
nation-state. To this they might still try to establish a field of negotiating in religious, cultural and 
political matters. The minorities can often be considered as victims of ethnic segregation (Eriksen 
2010: p. 151). 
Lastly, the third option evolves around exiting away from the boundaries of society, in other 
words, the minority group opting for this is incompatible with state policies and often wishes for 
full independence. They can furthermore always be considered as an ethnic community (ibid.).   
Having explained these three principles it should be mentioned that they are of their ideal 
form. In reality, these are being mixed together having aspects of both assimilation and 
segregation, and can have differences within the group concerning issues of independence. A 
term used to explain the field between assimilation and segregation is integration. The term 
implies that the minority both participate in the use of state institutes and in that the 
circumstances created by society, however, still fight to reproduce their own group identity and 
ethnic boundaries (ibid.).  
 
5.3. Strategies and tactics 
Now that we have described the main themes of Eriksen that will allow us to apply them in the 
analysis, we will move on and introduce what is meant by strategy and tactic - terms used by 
theorist Michel De Certeau found in the article “The Practice of Everyday Life” (1988).  
Strategies are models that are put up by power holders. De Certeau refers to the power 
holders as “the strong” and a power holder can be an instance such as the state, a municipality or 
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a business (de Certeau 1988: p. 34). These are agencies that have the potential to manipulate a 
certain group or a place depending on the context. There is always the consensus that the instance 
does hold the power to carry out the strategy. A strategy is the practice that the power holder 
executes in order to manipulate the group or place. The group or place is referred to as “the 
weak”. A strategy can be a law or a rule as well as a hegemonic view (ibid.).  
Tactics are the actions that are made possible when there is no power present. De Certeau 
describes a tactic as: “A tactic is determined by the absence of power just as a strategy is 
organized by the postulation of power” (de Certeau 1988: p. 38). These are actions carried out by 
the weak that navigates around or within the strategies performed by the strong. De Certeau 
actually uses an example of a tactic explaining how a North African Parisian living in the outer 
arrondissement is economically oppressed by the French government  when having to live in the 
ghetto. His tactic and way of resistance is expressed through his decoration of his house 
arranging the interior in such a way that it reminds him of his region of origin, Kabylia in Algeria 
(ibid. p. 30).  
In the same way we wish to use this theory of tactics and strategies to understand the 
hegemonic processes between the Amazigh activists and the Moroccan state. We will investigate 
the tactics used by the Amazigh movement and examine their possibilities of manipulating the 
power holders.  
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6. METHOD     
We will now explain and discuss which methods we used to conduct our data during the 
fieldwork in Morocco 
. 
6.1. Fieldwork 
Fieldwork is a social science method, which according to Kirsten Hastrup´s explanation, helps in 
gathering data that often concerns social interactions and how they are affected by the structures 
of society or a specific field (Brinkmann and Tanggaard 2015: p. 55). Also, Connie C. 
Christiansen define fieldwork as “a stay or ‘encounters’, involving some kind of travel of a length 
or character that is ‘something more than pass through” (Christiansen 1999: p. 52). This means 
there is a close contact between the research field and the society. And we are locating us in 
extension to these views. 
The data collection used in the project was conducted during a field trip in Morocco and the 
anthropological approach of fieldwork was important to understand the perspective of the subject. 
We are using this method in combination with qualitative interviews.  
 
6.1.1. Grounded Theory 
Glaser and Strauss developed Grounded Theory in 1967 as a method to challenge the hegemonic 
view of the importance of grand theories. They criticized the fact that many theories were 
constructed with the purpose of being universal. The argument for this criticism is the lack of 
validation if the theory does not emerge from the empirical data or the real world. Then, 
Grounded Theory is, as the name suggests grounded in empirical data (Kristiansen & Krogstrup 
1999: pp. 179-180).  
In Grounded Theory coding describes the process in which a certain and defined amount of 
data is being processed by reading and re-reading the material while categorizing the different 
themes that occur. The coding itself is a part of the analysis because the themes which will be 
analyzed are selected during this process (The Grounded Online). We will use the coding aspect 
of the method to categorize our data into different topics and it provides us with a set of terms 
and methodological tools like coding and theoretical sampling.  
This method is useful due to the relatively small amount of theoretical background needed 
prior to conduct the fieldwork in Morocco. The dialectic relation between the analysis and the 
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search for relevant theory provides us with the ability to adapt to the new knowledge we obtained 
during the coding and re-coding process. 
 
6.1.2. The Field 
In this section we seek to narrow the research field and specify how the field affects our 
collection of data. Our time in Morocco was spent in Marrakech, Rabat and Essaouira and in 
trains and busses between the three cities. The main part of our field work was carried out in 
Rabat, but we also conducted fieldwork and observations in the other areas of Morocco. By 
spending time in different places we achieved a somewhat broader perspective of the country, 
while still being aware that we did not achieve knowledge about all aspects of society and 
culture.  
Our field of research is based and defined by our interest in the Amazigh activism, which we 
got access to by seeking contacts via the internet while being in Denmark. We sought information 
about the Amazigh people and their struggle in Morocco as well as their way of resisting the 
dominating structures in the country. Secondly, we tried to observe and experience the society to 
understand how our informants live and get a more detailed perspective on their view of the 
world.  
 
6.1.3. Gatekeeper and contact 
The function and purpose of a methodological Gatekeeper is either to grant or deny access to a 
specific area of society or a geographical location. Thereon, to introduce the researcher to the 
characteristics and etiquettes of the field. At the same time a Gatekeeper has the ability to 
legitimize the persons and that person's presence in a considerably closed environment 
(Kristiansen & Krogstrup 1999: p.73).  
Mounir Kejji, who we will introduced in the section “Presentation of Data”, was our 
Gatekeeper as he is a well known figure in the Amazigh activist community. However, our field 
of research is greatly influenced by Kejji. He was our only contact prior to the fieldwork and he 
introduced us to the activists whom we later interviewed. That means that almost our entire data 
was influenced by him, which we were aware of and have reflected upon before starting the 
analysis. Cornwell and Atia state in their article that they research different organizations to 
dissect the perceived homogeneity of the Amazigh movement (Cornwell & Atia 2012: p. 256).  
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While we are aware of the heterogeneity of the movement, we considered it was enough to 
interview a small number of activists in order to answer our problem formulation, as long as we 
kept in mind that other organizations might function differently. 
 
6.1.4. Language 
The language in Morocco is multilingual. The largest part of the population speaks Arabic, yet 
many also speak French, Spanish and/or Tamazight. There is a language barrier we have to cross 
(Arabic to English or French to English). Judith Okely wrote “It is usually considered essential 
that the social anthropologist should learn and converse in the indigenous language.” (Okely 
1983: p. 43), however this was not possible in this project.  
When we collected our data through the interviews, we were aware that there is a language 
barrier and that we had to communicate in English, which is neither their or our first language. 
Misunderstandings and misreadings of the data can occur when it is collected , and that is the 
reason why this is being considered in the analysis (Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2015: p. 66).  
Besides the previously mentioned, it was decided that we did not need an interpreter because 
our initial contact, Kejji, indicated that the interviewees were able to understand and speak 
English on reasonable level. 
 
6.1.5. Blending in and participating in the field  
We will now explain the importance of blending in and participating in the field of research. The 
participation in the field is a basic part of anthropological fieldwork and we did that by travelling 
around Morocco for 14 days. During that time we observed and to some extend participated in 
the Amazigh activism (Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2015: p. 57). Prior to the fieldwork we gathered 
information about the area, the rules and the habits from that environment. In that we made 
adjustments to our appearance and gesture.   
“I made comparable adjustments in clothing: wearing modest longer skirts, loose, high 
necked sweaters. My gestures and stance changed unconsciously, as the alternative way 
of being came upon me.  (...) The Travellers responded favourably to these adjustments to 
their rules and ways, recognising them as respect” (Okely 1983: p. 43). 
Due to our preconceptions about the Moroccan society the female members of the project group 
dressed appropriate for the environment and to some extent the male members did the same. 
Though we did stand out as caucasian foreigners, the adjustment in our clothing showed respect 
to the local inhabitants in their way of doing things. As Okely mentions, by changing our 
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common habits of being for a more localized form in relation to the field, more often than not, it 
raises the chances of interacting with the local population (Okely 1983: p. 42).  
The importance of participating in the field and the value of a data collection like this is a 
possibility to experience interaction with locals on even ground in the complex reality of the 
subjects’ everyday life (Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2015: p. 57). That provides us with data we are 
able to use as a part of the dialectic process between data and theory, as well as understand the 
environment the interviewees live in.  
 
6.1.6. Observation in the field 
In the next section we will describe the conduction of the observations during the fieldtrip  and 
the reason for our decisions. First we need to make clear that we were only able to do fieldwork 
over a short period of time. Goffman's view is that observation studies should take at least a year 
in the field, which we for obvious reasons were not able to do (Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2015: p. 
88).  
The data we generated over the 14 days fieldwork only supplement the main sources of 
information, which are the interviews. The small time frame does affect our ability to generalise, 
but not the events we observed as such. That means that the notes of the event itself are not 
devalued.   
In accordance to the project’s subject we chose a more naturalistic axiom, ie we observe the 
subjects were they usually roam, or in places they choose. This helped us decide on time and 
subject of the observation. We conducted fieldwork at occasions related to the Amazigh activism 
as well as in relation to our general experience in Morocco. So in a way we did, more or less 
consciously, observe all the time. 
After a period of observation we talked about the observations we made and made collective 
notes about what we observed and what we thought about it. That means we took individual notes 
and fused them afterwards. We looked for everything related to the subject, everything that 
would help us understand it. The focus of our observations changed after a while, as we learned 
more about the subject.  
“Obviously my perception and memory of events had their own subjective filters, but 
material was not self-consciously eliminated from the beginning. Specific categories and 
topics emerged, maybe months after fieldwork.” (Okely 1983: p. 46). 
Our bias and our assumptions were intertwined in the process of observation and note taking, but 
this did not devalue our data.  
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6.1.7. Field Notation 
In our fieldwork and under the observations we were not always able or willing to take notes. 
“Without direct recording, many of the quotations have lost the original dialect and exact 
expression, so my notes are usually a paraphrase or 'translation'.” (Okely 1983: p. 46).  
That means information and data were influenced by the fact that we did not record 
everything. While in the field we only took notes if the natural environment were not getting 
disturbed.  Sometimes it was possible to record notes on our mobile phones or in a small 
notebook. As soon as possible after the observations we wrote more details and chronological 
notes. These documents we afterwards fused to one single document while reflecting on the 
experienced observations.   
 
6.2. Interview  
In this project we are using interviews for obtaining information from our participants and 
thereby getting data to help answer the problem formulation of the project. In this next section, 
we will try to explain how and why we are doing what we do when choosing the method of 
conducting interviews. 
In general, the interview has become one of the most used methods of doing qualitative 
research and obtaining empirical data. However, today not only the anthropologists or the 
journalists conduct interviews. In today’s society it has become a common part of everyday life 
and now we see political organisations and their parties, marketing businesses and public 
institutions conducting interviews and user surveys. This is the way in which they achieve 
information on the subjects of their choosing (Tanggaard & Brinkmann 2010: p. 37). 
The interview must always be considered as a social interaction between two or more persons 
that leads to a negotiated answer based on the contextual understanding on the given topic. This 
is why interviews are never a completely neutral way of obtaining data. However, in an interview 
the researchers get the opportunity to concentrate on how a person or organisation perceive a 
specific phenomenon from their perspective and this means that the interviewers will be able to 
do comprehensive analysis of an event or phenomenon from the perspective of fairly few 
interviewed people (Tanggaard & Brinkmann 2010: pp. 33-35).  
It is important to consider wisely the number of interviews needed, as having too many 
interviews may cause a kind of noise in the data collected. This meaning, that the group may find 
itself drowning in a sea of data and thereby it can be difficult to choose or select the data needed 
for answering the problem formulation. Nonetheless, if the group has too few interviews the data 
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collected could end up being too narrow and therefore it would not have proper validation for 
conducting the later analysis. (Tanggaard & Brinkmann 2010: pp. 33-35). The interviews will be 
combined with the observation studies in order to complement the informations we have 
collected in the interview.     
 
6.2.2. Type of interview 
The structure of the interview vary from the ‘loose structured interview’, ‘semi structured 
interview’ to the ‘hard structured interview’ (Tanggaard & Brinkmann 2010: pp. 37-38).  
Conducting interviews with a loose based structure is a method often used by ethnologists 
and anthropologists. It is a method used to get a close perspective on somebody’s life and 
understanding of an event or phenomenon. However, this type of interview has some 
disadvantages, because of its loose structure it can be hard for the researchers to hold their 
original perspective in collecting data. Therefore, it requires great practice to conduct this kind of 
interview. In contrast, the hard structured interview is the style of interview most people know 
from the surveys done by companies looking for very specific answers. This interview method is 
great when the answer of many participators is needed. This type of interview allows the data to 
be easy to categorise and quantify. However, the interviewed persons do not get much space in 
giving nuances to their answers (Tanggaard & Brinkmann 2010: pp. 37-38).  
In a reflection on how to conduct the interviews in Morocco and looking for a type of 
interview method that allowed the group to change direction in the interview, but still maintain 
some structure, we found that the semi-structured interview was the most relevant. This interview 
structure allows the researchers to have some questions written down in the interview guide, but 
also having the possibility of interacting with the interviewed and using the answers to convey 
new questions.  
 
6.2.3. Interview guide 
We wrote the following interview guide before we travelled to Morocco and used it to conduct 
the interview. However, we modified the guide during the interviews. When we had asked the 
interviewee a question we let them talk until they had finished. This means that we did not 
control the interviews strictly and instead let the conversation flow, but still in relation to our 
interview guide. During the first interview with Kejji, we asked many questions compared to the 
group interview where we had to limit the number of questions, because of the many participants.    
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The focus of the interviews we conducted are the cultural identity, the political activism of the 
interviewees and their view and interpretations of the world and the Amazigh movement.  
 
First we briefed the interviewee:   
- We will recode the interview 
- If you want to, we will give you an ALIAS for the project  
- What we are writing project about 
Personal  
- Present yourself (name, age, occupation, the organisation you belong to) 
- What is your background? Work/education/family/religious beliefs 
- Where did you grow up? 
- What languages do you speak? 
- How did you start in this organization? Why not other? 
- Do you identify as both Moroccan and Amazigh? 
- Amazigh/Berber, preferred word and why 
Politic and social situation  
- How many people are in this organization? Do they all identify as Amazigh? 
- What are the most important goals of the organization? (Are they the same as your 
personal goals for the movement?) 
- How do you fight for these goals? With what means/actions? 
- Is it realistic to reach your goals in a near future? 
- What role does this organization play in the movement for Amazigh Identity? 
- What about in the struggle for democracy? Is this important for your movement? 
- Are there discrepancies between the different Amazigh movements? 
- What is your role in the organization and in the movement? In Morocco and the 
Amazigh?  
- Current situation in Morocco in general rigth now ?  In relation to Amazigh? 
- What do you think about the current situation for the Amazigh people in the world and in 
Morocco? 
- What do you think about IRCAM? 
- What is Amazigh culture for you? Is this the same for your family/friends for example? 
- Do you have an official definition within the movement? 
- Who is Amazigh? 
 
 26 
6.2.4. Transcription 
As we recorded all of our interviews and thereby had them as audio files, it was necessary to 
transcribe them. We chose to transcribe the complete interviews as this would later allow us to 
analyse the contents thoroughly. However, we did not find it necessary to make the transcription 
very detailed in terms of things like indicating the pauses or the take-turning dynamics. We also 
omitted long breaks, interjections and intonations, and we decided to complete the words that 
perhaps were unfinished but understandable. The reason for this decisions is that, as previously 
mentioned, our focus is on the content found in the discourse of the interviewees instead of being 
on linguistic matters. This way of transcribing would not be very useful for the analysis we 
wanted to conduct.  
 
6.2.5. Covernames - ALIAS  
We will in this project use cover names to protect the identity of the interviewees and their 
relatives. It is not completely safe to be an activist in Morocco and Keiji told us about threats 
against activists and people who has disappeared. The only persons we will call by their real 
names are Mounir Kejji and Ahmed Adghirni, who denied the need for an ALIAS, when we 
asked them prior to the interview. 
The young activists we encountered under the group interview will not be called by their 
birth name. Because of the circumstances under which we conducted the interview, we did not 
get the chance to ask them about their opinion on a cover name. Therefore we decided not to take 
any chances and thus gave them the ALIAS to not expose them.    
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7. ANALYTICAL DESIGN 
In this section, we will explain the structure of our analysis. We will explain how we handled the 
data that we gathered in our fieldwork in Morocco and describe how we worked with this data 
material. Also, we will present which steps we took in the analysis. 
Our work process, as mentioned before, will be characterized by the reading and the 
rereading of our data material. We used the comment function of Google Drive to document our 
reflexions regarding different patterns, categories, personal statements, facts, differences 
compared to our presumptions and everything relevant for our field of interest.  
 
7.1. Work manual 
1. Read the data to get an overview of all the informations.   
2. Read the data again and indicate the relevant parts by using the comment function in 
Google Drive. Write down why they are relevant (Buzzwords)  
3. Go through all the marked parts and categorise the different sections (+ mark them with 
colors).  
4. Divide the sections/categories into subcategories 
5. Divide the subsections into sub-subsections if possible.  
6. Describe and analyse the sections, subsections and sub-subsections  
a. What defines the category ? 
b. Which statements are opposite to the definition? 
c. What does that mean?  
7. Theory linking: At this stage we have to link relevant theory to the categories and the 
coding that we have done so far.  
8. More coding and analysis. We will go back to the data and find more sections in the data 
that can relate with our findings or oppose them.  
9. Theory linking: We will adjust the theory we are using. 
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8. PRESENTATION OF DATA      
In the following we will present our interviewees and the process of collecting data in Morocco. 
Mounir Kejji is our most important contact in Morocco. We obtained his contact information 
through an American website called Amazigh World News, and they presented him as “one of 
the key leaders of the Amazigh movement”. This 43-year-old man is from a small town in the 
southeast of Morocco where he lived until he moved to Fés to study law. He has been working in 
an audiovisual company, and before he has worked with different music festivals as well as other 
media related jobs. He identifies as Amazigh. When asked which organization he is a part of, he 
does not answer completely clear, but it is our impression that he is somehow above this and 
works across organizations. He has been in Israel to work for a connection between Imazighen 
and Jews, and emphasizes this as a reason the media is focusing on him and (with his words) 
creating a polemic. 
We had arranged a meeting at Rabat central train station on the 19th of March, from where we 
would proceed to a place Kejji was to choose. In the group we were concerned with the idea of 
showing all together to the interview, as we kept in mind that the only contact we had with him 
prior to the meeting was through a few simple emails, we thought it would be too much. Jakob, 
Mads and Ida arrived at the train station five minutes before they were to meet with the 
interviewee, and spotted him quickly. He was dressed in a suit and so looked a lot more western 
than other Amazigh people we had had a chance to talk to up until that point. From there he led 
us to a café where we conducted the interview. He expressed disappointment that only three of us 
had gone, and seemed to draw the conclusion that we didn’t find him important enough to go all 
of us. There were only a few people in the restaurant when we entered and it was relatively quiet 
while we sat there. We each drank a cup of coffee, which Mounir insisted to pay for. The 
interview, which lasted about two hours, went very much as we had hoped for. The questions of 
the interview guide were rearranged according to how they fitted into the interview and also new 
questions popped up.  
Mounir Kejji turned out to be very valuable for our research. During our stay it seemed to us 
(both by the many people he greeted warmly in the street, and by his many facebook followers) 
that he has a great network of contacts. In the very interview, he had invited another man to talk 
with us. This man was Ahmed Adghirni, 68-year-old activist and lawyer. He co-founded PDAM, 
Parti Démocrate Amazigh Marocain in 2005, a party working for Amazigh rights (among other 
things). The party was banned in 2007 (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, 133). The arrival of Adghirni 
also necessitated some improvisation on our behalf. Adghirni, in spite of his age, spoke english, 
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but it was much harder to understand him than it was to understand Kejji. Therefore, some of the 
conversation in the interview went on in french between the two interviewees. This meant that 
Kejji took on a kind of translator role, in getting some of Adghirni messages across to us as 
interviewers. We felt that the interview had a friendly feeling throughout and it was with a smile 
we said our first goodbye to Kejji.   
The day after the official interview, the 20th of March, we accepted an invitation to Kejji’s 
house to eat and chat more informally. After this, we went to a demonstration. Although we 
didn’t conduct an official interview on this day, we included the data we collected in our analysis. 
We did not know exactly what would happen before going to Kejji’s house, but we took a few 
notes during the day and a lot more in a common meeting the next day. We thought it would 
collide to much with the informal mood to take a lot of notes during the visit, which is why we 
decided to take notes in a meeting the next day. We made a lot of interesting observations which 
will be elaborated on in the analysis.  
The 22nd he brought us to the headquarters of the organization Voix de la femme berbère. 
Here we were met by approximately 12 people involved in lesser or greater degree with this 
organization. During the interview, which lasted almost two hours, some people left and others 
arrived. When we arrived we were greeted by the president of the organization, but she quickly 
left for her office. We were seated around a big table together with the activists. They were 
mostly young with a few older people in between. There was a pretty even mix of men and 
women and they originated from different parts of Morocco. Thiyya is a young biologist and the 
general secretary of  Voix. Ijju is also young, and the only woman who wore a hijab at the 
gathering. She identifies as muslim and is project assistant in the Voix. Izri is young and also a 
member of the Voix and Izem is older than the rest and a member of a newly started literature 
club with Amazigh people. Tameqrant is also a member of the Voix and part of the female 
section of the political party Socialiste Unifié. She has been active in the southern Amazigh 
movement since 1990. Tilelli is the vice secretary of the Voix. Afasu is vice president in the Voix 
and studies physics. At the demonstration the 20th he was very active and shouted (to us mostly 
incomprehensible) messages in front of the demonstrating people.  
We did not know anything about how many people would show up or where we would do 
the interview, so we prepared as we best could and went there with an open interview guide and 
attitude. The activists were very talkative and passionate, so it was not hard to get them 
answering our questions and discussing different topics. The room we were in was noisy 
sometimes and people would leave and come as we were talking. There was also quite a language 
barrier, as people spoke English in varying degrees of fluency and some not at all. 
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Sometimes the discussion would escalate a bit and everyone spoke at the same time, so 
because of these problems there are many inaudible parts in the interview. 
These three days of collecting data, together with notes taken days where we did not have an 
official agenda, comprise our body of data, which we will analyse to answer our research 
questions.  
 
 
9. ANALYSIS   
In this section we will conduct the analysis, which we have chosen to part into three sections; 
Categorization, Political goals and Tools. In the section Categorization we will examine how the 
activists feel they are categorized, and how they categorize other ethnic groups themselves. In the 
section Political goals we will relate the most important goals as told by the activists, and they 
include universalized ideas to their struggle. In the last section, Tools, we will look at the 
different tools used by the activists to reach the aforementioned goals. 
 
9.1. Categorization 
The activists define their cultural identity by not only defining what it means to be Amazigh but 
also by categorizing other identities that surround them in society and affect them in numerous 
ways. This also contributes to explaining their problems and justifying their goals as a movement. 
When analyzing these categorization processes in the interviews it was possible to identify two 
different, but related focus points.  
The first focus is on how the activists define themselves as Amazigh and how they resist 
being marginalized by the state. The second focus is how the activists define other ethnic groups, 
especially in relation to themselves.  
 
9.1.1. How the Amazigh identify themselves 
Throughout the interviews and observations we conducted in Morocco, we found, to no great 
surprise, the importance for the activists in focusing on defining and expressing who they are as 
Amazigh people, and thereby how they identify their own ethnicity.  
Both the name Amazigh and Berber was used through the interviews by the activists to 
describe their ethnic group. 
 “Yeah, I am an Amazigh activist. From Morocco. I am Amazigh first. Because Amazigh 
it is the oldest. Because this borders it comes just recently, two hundred, three hundred 
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years or something. But Berbers it goes five thousand years. So for me I consider myself 
Amazigh first.” (Appendix 1: ll. 316-320). 
In relation to the quote above, we found, that the activists have a tendency to use the antiquity of 
the Amazigh history to define themselves. And this, despite the fact that all of the interviewees 
we met were born into a society mainly dominated by Arab structures, politics and culture, 
meaning that they have been through an arabization process (Appendix 1: ll. 246-250). Then by 
stating that Amazigh was there first, the argument basically gives the activists personal 
legitimacy when choosing Amazigh culture over Arab.  
Another categorization that we discovered when we asked Kejji whether there is an 
economical gap between Amazigh and Arabs, was that he makes an association between 
Amazigh and the lower class. When he answered the question he referred to the waiters of the 
restaurant we were in as being Amazigh, implying by this that it is Amazigh people who work as 
service workers. In contrast, the owner of the restaurant was Arab, and thus he would belong to a 
higher social class (Appendix 1: Kejji: ll. 704-719). By answering with the illustration of the 
waiters he strengthens the argument of Amazigh people being of lower social classes than Arabs. 
However, Eriksen mentions that ethnicity and social classes must, from an anthropological 
approach, be analysed separately (Eriksen 2010: pp. 60-61). Nevertheless, Kejji uses this 
argument to underline the categorization of Imazighen being victims of marginalization.  
The history was used to tell the story of Amazigh categorized as a marginalized people. 
Throughout the history of Morocco, we were told, that the Amazigh people constantly have been 
victims of oppression by several powers. In contemporary time, it has been the arabization of 
Morocco that the activists believe to be the key to what holds back the Amazigh culture in 
flourishing (Appendix 2: ll. 154-156). We found that the activists use their culture as an act of 
resistance towards the dominating Arabic structure of Moroccan society (Appendix 1: l. 107). 
The aspect of history seemed to be an important tool for the activists in general and will therefore 
be elaborated on later in the analysis.  
When stereotyping like Kejji did, a standardized relationship between Arabs and Amazigh is 
created where cultural differences are emphasized and common cultural ground ignored or 
downplayed. It could also have been interesting to investigate further what this common ground 
consist in. Religion could actually be one, as many Amazigh do identify as being Muslim 
(Kahina 2013), but this is mostly downplayed by the activists we spoke to. This is part of the 
dichotomy constructed by the activists between Arabs and Amazigh. Contrasting is thus very 
much present in the rhetorics of the activists, in the way they distance themselves from the Arab 
culture, a matter to which we will return later. Matching is also present in the rhetorics of the 
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activists, as they not only acknowledge the differences between them and the Arabs, but they also 
see how the fact that their culture differs from the Arab culture is actually an advantage for the 
society in general. For example, they emphasize gender equality as a value that is specifically 
connected to the Amazigh culture (we will come back to how later), and opposite to the values of 
the Arab culture. In this way, they are saying that Amazigh can contribute with something very 
important to society.  
However, when looking into the fact that they do not mention any assets of Arab culture at 
all, it is possible to see that they do not establish a discourse of two cultures complementing each 
other, but rather one where only the Amazigh is an asset to the majority. It would be interesting 
to investigate how the Arab majority views the Imazighen, to see if contrasting or matching were 
more prevalent in their view of the Imazighen. Perhaps they would regard the old culture of the 
Imazighen and their knowledge of arts and music, as the more folkloric aspects of as an asset for 
Morocco in general. They are confining them to the realm of folklore, but in the way of 
matching, as they are acknowledging the differences, and perhaps seeing them as an asset.  
In the movements activists can become part of a group identity and are then able to express 
their various dissatisfactions with the government in a more powerful way. The resistance is 
being effectuated through the movements. As one activist mentioned:  
“By forming an organisation like this for example a lot of Amazigh guys and women who 
all try to get rid of this marginalization” (Appendix 2: ll. 139-144). 
Eriksen mentions that one of the reasons for an individual to even consider ethnicity as part of 
one’s identity, is the organisational opportunities it gives to work for common cultural (or in this 
case, political as well) interests. In the quote above we see how this opportunity is seized by the 
Amazigh. They are attempting to work against the assimilation by revitalizing their culture.  
One major aspect of the above mentioned marginalization is the feeling the activists have that 
their culture and language is being marginalized into folkloric tales, belonging only to past times 
in the history of Morocco (Appendix 2: ll. 129-136). It is possible to interpret this as an aspect of 
complementarity or matching. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that the majority is 
acknowledging the differences between Arabs and Amazigh, but at the same time marginalizing 
them by confining them to folklore. 
The importance given to the language, Tamazight, varies between the activists. Some say that 
the movement goes beyond a fight for cultural or linguistic aspects, but others are greatly 
interested in the revindication of the Tamazight as a valuable language in society. “The language 
is very important. To speak it and have the right to speak it everywhere” (Appendix 2: ll. 357-
367). Others expressed that Tamazight is not only a way of communicating, but an aspect deeply 
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linked to a way of life, and they mention it should be used through many things like songs, art, 
education, and of course communication (Appendix 2: l. 394). So, we found the language to be of 
some importance to the activists in defining themselves. However, because so many Amazigh 
people have not learned to speak Tamazight it did not seem to be that important in identifying as 
Amazigh - it was more significant being in opposition to the structures that have been keeping 
Tamazight away from the educational system of Morocco.  
Which leads us to the second focus point, how the Amazigh activist identify other ethnic 
groups.  
 
9.1.2. How the Amazigh identify other ethnic groups 
As mentioned before, one effect of forming movements like the one we encountered is that the 
activists involved form a common ground where they can discuss and formulate a value set that 
defines them as Amazigh. Eriksen mentions that group identities always must be defined in 
relation to what they are not. So, this means that when group identities are being formed they are 
doing so in relation to the non-members of that group (Eriksen 2010: p. 13).  
Throughout the interviews we found that the activists systematically categorized themselves 
as marginalized. This being done in the minority/majority question involving Amazigh culture 
and the dominating Arabic culture. Today 40-45% of the 30 million inhabitants of Morocco are 
Amazigh, but before the independence of Morocco the Amazigh amounted to a majority in 
relation to the Moroccan Arabs (Maddy-Weitzman 2006: p. 72). The estimated number of 
Imazighen in the Moroccan population vary widely and we have found numbers ranging from as 
low as 30% to as high as 60% (Cornwell & Atia 2012: p. 259).   
We found that the activists mostly focused on the differences between the two cultures. 
However, within their definition of the Arab culture, they make categorizations in the differences 
between the people involved. The categories used about people within the Arab culture are 
Muslims, Islamists, Pan-arabists and Arabs. Different amounts of criticism and blame was 
justifiable for the activists to be placed onto the different groups. In general we found the activists 
to have a tendency to talk rather negatively about the Arab culture. For example, they made a 
generalization of the attitude of the common Arab by stating that the Arab culture as a whole is 
against gender equality: 
“So we need to have the focus that Amazigh culture is equality without sex and that there 
is no differences between woman and man. But as I said Arab culture is fighting that” 
(Appendix 2:  ll. 59-61).  
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Several activists also made it clear that Islam is not the only cause to the problems they are 
experiencing. They claim a big part of the problem is to be found in relation to the Pan-arabs and 
Arab nationalism that has been dominating the cultural and political scene in the countries of 
North Africa, along with Morocco (Cornwell & Atia 2012: p. 256).  
Of course Arab nationalism includes Islam as a religion. But the activists made it clear that it 
is not the religion itself that contains the power and willingness to marginalize the Amazigh 
people. Instead the activists pointed to structures of the arabization influenced by an Islamic 
ideology. This is for example being effectuated through the consistent renewal and construction 
of new mosques, built by the state all around Morocco (Appendix 2: ll. 98-99). In general the 
activists had a slightly more positive discourse in speaking about Muslims. One spoke very 
openly about being both Muslim and identifying as Amazigh, even though it started a discussion 
about the activists personal convictions concerning religion. Adding to this the movement’s 
political values of secularism would entail the allowance of Islam and Muslims in Moroccan 
society.  
The activists talked specifically negative about pan-Arabs and Islamists. They often 
associated the pan-Arabs and the Islamists with the power holders who define the terms of the 
national identity. The activists claim that the people holding the power have political goals that 
are against the values that the Amazigh believe in. Especially when it comes to freedom of 
religious choice and equality between the genders (Appendix 2: ll. 77-84).   
On several occasions the activists categorized the Arab powers to be in opposition to the 
Amazigh. They explain how the Islamic structures of the Arab powers try to assimilate the people 
of Amazigh into the national identity the state promotes. This being effectuated through examples 
like the priorly mentioned one, concerning the construction of mosques wherein Islamic ideology 
is being taught. Also, because of the fact that Arabic is the dominant language of Morocco some 
might choose not to learn the language of Tamazight (Appendix 2: p. 3). 
Kejji went on to refer to Arabs in general as being an ideological enemy to the Amazigh 
(Appendix 1: 226-230). This categorization of Arabs as being an enemy goes into a context of 
good and evil. Whereas, the Amazigh are being classified as ‘the good group of identity’, being 
both including, open minded and truth-telling the Arabs are classified as ‘the evil’ assimilating 
and marginalizing power. There were no real clear boundaries in the classification of the Arab 
culture. Seemingly attempts were made in distinguishing between different identity groups within 
the culture. However, more often than not, the activists categorized the Arab culture as one large 
opposition group in relation to the Amazigh. 
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9.2. Political goals 
In this section we will examine the political situation of the Amazigh activists. The two 
interviews show us that the Amazigh activists are pursuing political goals which focus on their 
identity and at the same time they are fighting for universalized ideas such as human rights, 
democracy, secularism and gender equality. 
 
9.2.1. Amazigh political activism 
The context for the Amazigh activists is the political situation of Moroccan society. We found 
that several attempts have been made in getting an Amazigh party into the sphere of political 
power. Ahmed Adghirni, the man we met at our first interview with Kejji, was the political leader 
and founder of the Moroccan Amazigh Democrat Party. Their political fight was to promote the 
cultural, linguistic and religious diversity within the Moroccan Kingdom. However it only lasted 
two years when it, in Kejji’s words, was dissolved by the state (Appendix 1: ll.375-388). 
Kejji describes that the political arena is now dominated by more than five Islamic political 
parties (Appendix 1: ll. 380-388). Whereas the Amazigh political parties are against the 
arabization and Pan-arabism with King Mohammed VI and prime minister Abdelillah Benkirane 
in power. The people we interviewed all recognized the fact that Moroccan society has undergone 
some change since King Mohammed VI took over after the death of his father Hassan II in 1999 
(Appendix 2: ll. 79-80). For instance, because of international and domestic pressure the 
Amazigh people got a television channel that broadcasts Amazigh news and other television 
programmes. Furthermore, the state established l’Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh, or 
IRCAM. The Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, in English, was allegedly established to meet 
some of the demands of the Amazigh movements. This indicates a change in Morocco.  
It has in large parts been challenged by the activists as they have arrived to the conclusion 
that the institute is the state attempting to turn the Amazigh people into folklore (Silverstein & 
Crawford 2004). In the group interview Asafu explains that the Moroccan state has economical 
interests in keeping the Amazigh culture as folklore (Appendix 2: ll. 369-375). The activists also 
claim that the institute has seen the light of day because it would have had the capability to calm 
down the anger of the Amazigh people who felt oppressed (ibid.: ll. 383-387). Kejji claims that 
the institute has a lot of financial support, but no real power in changing the situation of the 
Amazigh population. Instead the activists spend their time doing what they feel IRCAM is 
neglecting to do.  
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Although all of the activists we spoke to expressed opposition to IRCAM the institute also 
has its supporters. Cornwell and Atia write in their article “Imaginative geographies of Amazigh 
activism in Morocco” about the debate surrounding IRCAM (Cornwell & Atia 2012). They 
describe that IRCAM supporters see the centralization of Amazigh culture in the shape of 
IRCAM as a positive step in the development (ibid.: p. 263). Some of the positive effects of 
IRCAM are pointed out. For example, it has an open library and regular cultural events such as 
concerts with Amazigh music and arts are on display (ibid.: p 267). The institute also manages 
the publication of a periodical, poetry and other literature, all in Tamazight.  
However, the activists we interviewed want their struggle to be political and not solely 
cultural. The critics of the institute claim that IRCAM is confining the Imazighen to a cultural 
and folkloric realm focusing only on e.g. arts or literature. By confining the Amazigh identity to a 
single institution, the state is also avoiding to incorporate Amazigh culture and values in the 
whole state system (Cornwell & Atia 2012: p. 268). The activists to whom we spoke confirm 
what Cornwell and Atia write; progress for them is democracy, equal rights and secularism and it 
is not enough to include the cultural components of Amazigh culture. The institute can thus be 
seen as a part of the assimilation conducted by the state (Ibid: p. 267).  A point that will be 
elaborated further on in this analysis.  
 
9.2.2. Democracy and Secularism 
The participants of the interviews often emphasize that democracy is an essential part of the 
solution to their problems. We notice that they are convinced that achieving democracy will 
automatically bring them a big step closer to attaining their political goals. Keiji says: 
“We are fighting for democracy in general. We want our country to be democrat. And 
democracy impose to leave our rights and our fighters to have their culture, our culture, 
their language everywhere. In television, in the tribunal, to give the names of our children 
without any problems (...)” (Appendix 1: ll. 602-605).  
They are also convinced that democracy will bring secularism which is an important political 
goal among the Amazigh activists:  
“(...) We are fighting for diversity and languages, diversity and religious choice, for 
example, and as activists we are fighting for secularism. Secularism is very important in 
our fight” (Appendix 1: ll. 82-83). 
They believe that the concept of secularism holds the answer to how the Amazigh culture can 
flourish and coexist with the Islamic community. This was an important point for the activists to 
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convey to us. “We respect all religions and have the right to choose what we want” (Appendix 2: 
ll. 328-329). However, we were informed that the structures of the Islamic community and 
religious Muslim leaders are doing little or nothing to change the political and religious situation. 
Kejji describes how a person of Christian or Jewish descent is able to convert into Islam but 
Muslims can not convert into another religious belief. Furthermore, if you are born in Morocco 
you are automatically Muslim and can not change your religion (Appendix 1: ll. 93-96). We 
attempted to find a law that could confirm this statement but did not succeed. Instead, the law 
Kejji referred to prohibits proselytizing Muslims to other religions.  
The majority of Moroccans are Muslims which is interesting in relation to how invisible 
Muslims are in the organization we visited. Naturally, it is difficult to know how many Imazighen 
really identify as being Muslim, as for example Kejji is officially a Muslim, but do not identify as 
one.  There are many Amazigh who in fact identify as Muslims (Kahina 2013). It is therefore 
contradictory to their values of diversity and inclusion if Muslims are silenced/invisibilized in the 
Amazigh movement. It could also complicate mobilization, ie recruiting people for the 
movement.  
The Imazighen emphasize that they are fighting for diversity. Cornwell and Atia write that 
the Amazigh movement is resisting the homogenizing narrative involved in nation-building by 
trying to find a place inside the Moroccan national narrative. They continue to write that this 
process is homogenizing in the same way as the activists they have spoken to try to define 
Morocco as an Amazigh country, and not Arab (Cornwell & Atia 2012: p. 258). Perhaps the 
activists we had the chance to speak to were aware of this problem as they argued that Morocco 
should be both Arab and Amazigh and that diversity was what they wanted. 
Another oppressing aspect of the current situation is that the state has taken the names of 
Amazigh tradition off the official naming list (Appendix 1: ll. 604-608). It is a common strategy 
used by majorities to forbid ethnic minority names in order to oppress and assimilate. Another 
example is the banning of Turkish names thirty years ago in Bulgaria by the communist regime 
(dw.com). These points are clear examples of the arabization and illustrate the assimilation of 
everything not Arab culture (Eriksen 2010: pp. 121-123). The mere presence of the Amazigh 
people complicate the national narrative of Morocco, and therefore there have been attempts to 
assimilate this identity (Johnson 1995 in Cornwell & Atia 2012: pp. 256-257). Furthermore, we 
also perceive these actions as strategies according to what is defined by de Certeau. In this case, 
the Moroccan government has the power to carry out actions in order to manipulate the 
population. In this way, it uses the strategy of making Amazigh names forbidden to directly 
control the minority of the Amazigh people.  
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The result of the arabization is that the national narrative of Morocco becomes only Arab and 
Kejji highlights these issues to explain the importance of a democratic and secular society. 
 
9.2.3. Universalized values 
As previously mentioned, the Amazigh movement is connecting democracy, secularism and 
freedom of religious choice to their cultural identity. These values are considered as universal 
ideals in large parts of the Western world. The Imazighen connect their cultural identity to 
universalised ideas in order to promote and reach their political goals. In addition to these 
principles they are also fighting for human rights and especially Amazigh women’s rights. 
They claim that women have always been important and that gender equality also existed in 
the past within the Amazigh culture. For example, Kejji uses history to emphasize the status of 
the women in Amazigh culture (Appendix 1: ll. 629-630). This will be further elaborated on in 
the section Tools. A participant from the group interview also uses the history to explain the 
present situation for Amazigh women: 
”We had occupation since 14th century, so a lot of rights and principles got lost and 
destroyed. So that is what we look into. So now the victims of all this is woman, because 
in the Islamic culture woman is less than the man.” (Appendix 2: ll. 55-58). 
The Amazigh values regarding women were overruled by Islamic beliefs and that is what the 
Amazigh activists are trying to revive. Men and women are equal in the Amazigh culture. It is 
also mentioned that the Islamic culture is against gender equality (ibid.: ll. 44-53). As Eriksen 
describes, a group identity is constructed by highlighting what it is different from (Eriksen 2010: 
p. 13) which in this case is the Arabic culture concerning gender equality. The view on women 
seems to be a central marker for the differences which divide the Arabic and Amazigh culture 
ideologically.  
By mixing the modern universalized ideas with the Amazigh identity they are also linking 
themselves to Western ideologies. In this case the Imazighen enter into a relationship with the 
Western world through the shared universalized ideologies.  
 
9.2.4. Socio-economic problems 
In both interviews the participants focus on the socio-economic situation as a central problem in 
their political fight. They fight to improve the conditions for the Amazigh people in the poorest 
areas of the country (Appendix 1: ll. 187-192). The living standards in these rural areas are 
considered to be exceptionally low:  
 39 
“Conditions, yes, countryside some areas that people that they live like 15th century, very, 
very bad conditions, no water, no electricity, no schools, no hospitals, no telephone, no 
nothing” (Appendix 1: ll. 180-189). 
Kejji explains that there are very wealthy areas in Morocco, and the state is creating and 
maintaining this socio-economic gap (ibid.: ll. 180-192). He also mentions that the richest in the 
country have an interest in keeping the poor areas economically oppressed and that is also one of 
the reasons why the state is not improving the conditions of these areas. This is a case of 
segregation as explained in our theoretical section (Eriksen 2010: pp. 121-123). Furthermore, we 
consider this a strategy. A strategy that the state in power implement in order to manipulate the 
poor population. They dominate the minority because of reasons, as stated in our theoretical 
section, that could be related to economic or social interests. Therefore, the socio-economic 
aspect is a critical problem and important in the Amazigh movement’s political fight.  
It seems that it is only the poor Imazighen that the Amazigh movements are fighting for. Kejji 
does not mention any poor Arabs and he only mentions the Amazigh areas when he explains that 
“(...) the problem is more than the cultural endings, It’s connected to socio-economical political 
positions of Berber area (...)” (Appendix 1: ll. 183-184). Also, when asked directly about the 
financial and social differences about Arabs and Amazigh he avoids answering the question. This 
is another contradiction in the activists argumentation as they claim a diversity that is reserved 
their own people.  
   
9.2.5. Culture, Language and History 
Another important aspect of the Amazigh movement’s political fight is to promote their culture 
and language. This will also be analysed further in the section Tools. To underline how essential 
culture is for the Imazighen, Kejji says: “(...) the Amazigh culture for us is our existence.” 
(Appendix 1: l. 476).  
As previously mentioned, one of the key objectives is to promote the Amazigh language 
Tamazight. The participants of the group interview explain that they have to learn classical 
Arabic and French in school. In order to keep their identity they wish to incorporate Tamazight 
fully so that it is equal to Arabic and French (Appendix 2: ll. 52-53). The language oppression is 
also present in the Moroccan court. In the courtroom only Arabic is spoken and therefore the 
Tamazight-speaking convicts are not considered to be “real” Moroccans. As Kejji says “he is 
foreigner in his own country” (ibid.: l. 17). 
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This example shows us that the linguistic fight is not just a promotion of Tamazight but also 
a fight against alienation in the Moroccan society. The language seems to be a representation of 
the Amazigh culture and the many problems related to it. One of the interviewees says: “We have 
to consider that Tamazight is seen in a negative way” (ibid.: l. 355). There are stigmas related to 
Tamazight and as a resistance to these stigmas the interviewee explains that they have to keep 
and promote their language (ibid.: ll. 334-340). This is the reason why Tamazight is such an 
important part of the Amazigh movement’s political fight.  
The Amazigh activists also use their cultural identity towards different goals. 
“Although ethnicity is not wholly created by individual agents, it can simultaneously 
provide agents with meaning and with organisational channels for pursuing their 
culturally defined interests” (Eriksen 2010: p. 23).  
They both gain personal identity and thus meaning and are able to organize in groups as La Voix 
de la Femme Amazigh through which they can work for different goals.  
Another fundamental aspect of the identity politics is the history of the Amazigh people. The 
history is used several times in the interviews to emphasize and explain the values of the 
Amazigh today. In this way the activists select parts of their history and link them to 
universalized values. They mix and connect their ancient culture with modern western principles. 
In other words, they use their history to highlight the present problems of Moroccan society 
(Eriksen 2010: p. 30). Later in the analysis we will elaborate on how the Amazigh use history as 
a tool to reach their political goals. 
 
9.3. Tools 
In this project we examine how Amazigh activists use their cultural identity as a resource. In the 
two interviews we noticed a number of different ways this was done and we use the term “tools” 
to explain this.  
In the following section we will investigate these different tools and how they are used. 
 
9.3.1. History 
Eriksen argues that anthropologists most often see and investigate history as “a response to 
requirements of the present” (Eriksen 2010: p. 85). This is what we will do in the following 
section. Therefore we want to examine how “particular historical accounts are used as tools in the 
contemporary creation of identities and in politics” (ibid.).  
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Throughout our conversations with the Amazigh activists we noticed a great emphasis on 
history. When we first asked Kejji what Amazigh culture was to him he answered by first 
describing the vastness of the Amazigh land “10 million square kilometers” (Appendix 1: l. 458) 
and then the diversity within the Amazigh people. Next he goes on to tell us about how old the 
culture is: “Our existence is more than 4-5.000 years” (ibid.: l. 478) and says that it is a crime to 
kill a culture that is so old. In this way he is using the age and the history of the Amazigh to argue 
against the assimilation strategy of the state.  
He makes various connections to other cultures and historical events. After creating a 
connection with the Egyptian culture by mentioning that the daughter of Cleopatra married a 
Amazigh King and thus creating a friendship between the Amazigh and the Egyptians, he 
proceeded to make a similar connection with us. But it was not only Kejji creating the 
connection. It was created in collaboration with ourselves as we found the connection established 
with Vikings and Imazighen interesting and helped to constitute it. As Mads said, we were “(...) 
before enemies, now friendship” (ibid.: l. 555). After the interview Kejji and Adghirni even went 
on to say that the vikings were really not that bad. At least they did not colonize Morocco. Even 
though Vikings and Amazigh have a violent past (Kendrick 1930: p. 208), this is downplayed, 
and instead the colonizers are constituted as the actual enemies.  
In these connections we see how history is used as a way of establishing friendships and 
alliances between cultures. A historical narrative can thus be used as a tool to argue for or against 
something in the present or to explain current phenomena. As Thiyya said in the interview: “And 
we are looking for our history to understand things (...)” (Appendix 2: l. 434). Cornwell and Atia 
write about how Imazighen use for example historical narratives, or temporal imaginings, to 
bring the Amazigh identity to the center of Moroccan political landscape and to counteract the 
marginalization of their cultural identity (Cornwell & Atia, 2012: p. 263). The common ancestral 
identity, stated by Eriksen to be an important factor in defining an ethnic group is being 
established here.  
The activists construct a narrative in which gender equality has always been a part of 
Amazigh culture. When telling about the importance of women in the Amazigh culture, Kejji 
said:  
“You have to know that before the Islam came to North Africa for example the Arabs are 
killing their daughters in the middle east, especially in Saudi and at the same moments the 
Amazigh have a queen, Dihya. We have a very famous woman in our history.” (Appendix 
1: ll. 627-630).  
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The names Kahina and Dihya refer to the same person (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: p. 24). The 
Imazighen define themselves as being in opposition to the Arab culture and emphasize their 
queen because she is in accordance with the current values of gender equality. When Kejji says: 
“the Arabs were killing their daughters” he presents the Arabs in a rather negative way. The 
stereotyping can be seen as a resentment towards the dominating group as Eriksen explains 
(Eriksen 2010: p. 30). 
Ijju also brings the queen up in the group interview and, judging by her enthusiasm when 
telling about the queen, we assume the queen is important to her (Appendix 2: ll. 489-490). So, in 
the example with gender equality the history of the Amazigh culture is used to promote and 
justify a political goal. The value and goal of gender equality is justified by using the historical 
narrative that women have always been important in their culture, and also by using the queen. 
The story of Dihya helps both Imazighen and people with other cultures to link together 
Amazigh culture and gender equality. History is also connected to education and visibility, a 
topic that we will return to later. As Thiyya said, it is important to know the history to even 
understand the culture. This was mentioned several times by different people, also as a piece of 
advice for us, in relation to our project. We had to study the history to understand the position of 
the Imazighen in the current society. 
 
9.3.2. Language 
As previously mentioned, languages are evident in everything in Moroccan culture. Arabic, 
French, and Tamazight are widely spoken and we experienced this multilinguality first hand as 
researchers. 
First of all, being able to speak Tamazight is considered an essential part of the Amazigh 
identity and both Kejji and all subjects of the group interview seem to emphasize the fact that 
being able to speak their native language is closely connected to their own personal identities. 
However, we also see the practicing of Tamazight as a political tool. Both to make the culture 
visible but also in order to change the discourse of Amazigh. 
While interviewing Kejji we noticed that he places his orders in Tamazight and we  proceed 
to ask why. He answers that the waiters serving us are Imazighen and therefore they 
communicate in Tamazight (Appendix 1: l. 720). Furthermore, Thiyya of the group interview 
informs us that just 10 years ago only a fool would speak Tamazight in the streets. This points to 
the fact that the status of Tamazight is changing (Appendix 2: ll. 324-327). Naturally, the change 
is prompted by the official recognition of the language as well. Earlier in the interview Kejji also 
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touched this point as he argued that they use their language as an act of resistance (Appendix 1: l. 
109). The situation we experienced where Kejji places his order in Tamazight clearly seems to be 
an example of this. Speaking their language publicly makes the Amazigh culture visible. It 
reveals the identity of the speakers and it shows that they are not afraid to be loyal to who they 
are. So, speaking Tamazight is a tool, or an act of resistance, that helps to change the discourse of 
the Amazigh people.  
 
9.3.3. Rhetorics 
The activists used a wide variety of rhetorical tools in order to argue for or against certain aspects 
of society. Comparisons to other cultures, nations or struggles were often made. For example, 
Kejji argues for lingual diversity by making a comparison with Switzerland which has four 
official languages (Appendix 1: ll. 77-79). Ijju (the Muslim activist) also mentions that the 
predominant religion in Indonesia is Islam in order to make the point that you do not need to be 
Arabic to be Muslim (Appendix 2: ll. 229-230). By this she means that she has the right to be a 
Muslim just as Arabs do.  
Often Kejji and some of the young activists used very strong comparisons, expressions or 
words to emphasize some problem or specific goal. When explaining about the prohibition on 
Amazigh names, Kejji said  
“But if you want to give him an Amazigh name, they are telling you, sorry it doesn’t exist 
in the list. It’s for us, it’s system of apartheid. Apartheid! We are talking about apartheid, 
about racism.” (Appendix 1: ll. 607-608).  
By using the word apartheid Kejji is referring to a well known struggle. He is comparing the 
Amazigh fight with apartheid to indirectly legitimize their own ethnic struggle. This comparison 
can be seen as an exaggeration of the Amazigh people’s problems because the level of violence 
towards the Amazigh in Morocco can not be compared to the situation in South Africa during the 
period of apartheid. Even though the use of the word apartheid is an exaggeration it is reasonable 
to call the prohibition for racism as it is oppressing the Amazigh identity and ethnicity to force 
them to choose Arabic names. Although the law prohibiting Amazigh names is oppressing 
specifically Imazighen, the alleged law against conversion previously mentioned is not. When 
Kejji choose the word apartheid he is linking the Amazigh struggle to another minority struggle. 
As Cornwell and Atia also observe, the activists use minority rights’ arguments to argue for their 
own political recognition and to legitimize their struggle (Cornwell & Atia, 2012: p. 260). 
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As mentioned earlier, Kejji states that it is illegal according to the Moroccan law to convert 
from Islam to other religions. When talking about this Kejji said: “(...) it’s forbidden for example 
for Moroccans if they want to change to be christians for example, they can be killed.”. 
(Appendix 1: ll. 86-87). Afterwards he said the following: “ Now they are not killing but there is 
an article 220, Christians can be in the prison for … and we are fighting against this.” (Appendix 
1: ll. 89- 95). Kejji first makes it seem like there is a death penalty for converting, and then 
admits that there is not. Furthermore, this law is not only oppressing Amazigh people, but all 
Moroccans.  
Especially with Kejji, but also in some cases with the other activists of the group, science and 
statistics were used to support their claims. This is a normal praxis in the field of politics and it 
was interesting how Kejji used seemingly exact numbers and referred to a great number of 
different sources like videos, books and articles. For example, he offered to send us pictures and 
videos of a demonstration that had been done to show sympathy with an Amazigh student that 
had been killed (ibid.: ll. 194-202). He only sent us a few videos after the interviews, and even 
after asking him for specific things, he did not send it.  
At one point Kejji explained: “You cannot lie to the science. Science is science. Science is 
not an ideology. And science is opposite with ideology all the time. There is an opposition 
between them.” (ibid.: ll. 312-314). In this explanation we see why he makes so much emphasis 
on facts and science as Kejji wants to distance himself from the predominant ideology and tries to 
establish the truth of his claims through science.   
 
9.3.4. Symbolism  
In this section we will point out the use of symbolism among the Amazigh activists.  
Several times during the fieldwork, interviews, observations and even during the preparations 
prior to the travel we encountered the Amazigh flag which seems to be the most important 
symbol for the Amazigh activists (Appendix 2: ll. 461-467; Appendix 3: l. 9+52).  
The Amazigh flag contains the colors blue, green and yellow bound together by a red symbol 
which we came to associate with the Tamazight alphabet(Appendix 6: picture 6). The three 
colours symbolize that the Amazigh people come from the coast area (blue), the mountains 
(green) and the desert (yellow). The red sign (ⵣ) in the middle stands for the letter “Z” in the 
Tamazight alphabet (Tifinagh) which is symbolizing a human longing for freedom by lifting the 
arms towards the sky (Sache 2014; agadiramazighi.wordpress.com). 
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Today, the flag stands out as an unifying symbol. A participant from the group interview 
described the fight and struggle they had in the past to be able to ”have that right to have our 
flag” (Appendix 1: l. 467). That indicated that the activists find the flag very important as a 
symbol that represents their culture.  
As described in the method section our view on this subject did change during the fieldwork. 
In the beginning of our fieldwork we most likely missed the importance of the flag to the 
Amazigh movement. But as we experienced that the flag was used time after time in different 
contexts we became aware that it was a very strong and unifying symbol. We discovered that the 
same ⵣ symbol and flags not only in the contexts that had direct connection to our research field 
but also in other spaces of the cities we visited during our travel in Morocco. For instance, we 
noticed the Amazigh flag in touristic stores, as graffiti on walls, in the windows of private homes 
and in the organization we visited. On the Facebook profiles of the Imazighen activists the flag is 
also used abundantly.  
After the group interview with the activists we were encouraged to pose for a group-picture 
with the Amazigh flag placed in front of us. Afterwards, the picture was posted on Facebook and 
received  thousands of “likes” (Appendix 6: picture 5). The reason why the picture received so 
many likes on Facebook was probably because we, as representatives of Europe, were holding 
the Amazigh flag while making the Amazigh hand gesture. The flag in the picture represents the 
Amazigh movements cause and links it to Europe through us. The fact that we hold an Amazigh 
flag represents European attention to their struggle (Appendix 5: ll. 94-95). We were being used 
as a tool in their political fight which will be elaborated later in the analysis. The flag functions as 
tool for Amazigh people to recognize each other and connect them with the Amazigh movement 
and ethnicity. 
Another symbol which we encountered during our fieldwork was the Amazigh hand gesture 
(Appendix 6: picture 3 and 4). We were told that the three fingers represent the man, the land and 
the language, similar to the meaning of the the flag. During the demonstration in front of the 
parliament the protesters used the Amazigh hand gesture as well as covering themselves in their 
flags and showing posters with Tifinagh scripts. This hand gesture can be seen as an act of protest 
and as an identification with the political cause and the Amazigh identity. We as participants in 
the field were encouraged likewise to gesture the sign.  
Strong symbolism is often used by nationalistic movements. Even though the Amazigh ethnicity 
does not have or imagine their own nation state, they still belong to the category nationalist in 
many ways. First of all they do claim to have a territorial belonging, but there are also other 
similarities. Nationalists usually link ethnicity with policy. They also make use of markers of 
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identity such as symbols and language. A very clear link between Amazigh politics and the way 
nation-states function is that they imagine and relate to the idea of gathering people with common 
interests and values, even though it is not likely that all of these people meet someday. 
To sum up, the Amazigh flag as well as the hand gesture, which we encountered during our 
fieldwork and interviews, were used as tools to unite under a common group identity. The 
symbols are also closely linked to the activists’ political cause and being free people, subject they 
talked about at the demonstration.  
 
9.3.5. Visibility and educational aspects 
Making the Amazigh culture visible is a big part of the activism that we experienced. As we 
entered both the home of Kejji and the headquarters of Voix de la Femme Amazigh, we 
encountered walls covered with Amazigh cultural objects and flags. Naturally, making their 
culture evident becomes a tool to promote themselves as activists and gives the impression that 
they are a cultural group. By making themselves visible they attempt to appeal to the rest of 
Morocco and Europe, and our interview reveals that they have different ways of accomplishing 
this.  
Some activists have made a book club to discuss Amazigh literature (Appendix 2: ll. 280-
284) and they hold workshops where they attempt to involve women in politics (ibid.: ll. 301-
306). Also, one activist was considering making an Amazigh radio programme (ibid. 2: ll. 537-
541). These are all acts of cultural activism and according to Kejji, the main reason of these acts 
is to become visible. Becoming visible to the rest of Morocco and the outside world is important 
in order to promote their identity and change the discourse of Amazigh. Kejji also points out the 
fact that we went there because they had made their cause visible (Appendix 1: ll. 425-429). 
As referenced before, it is forbidden by law to give children Amazigh names and therefore 
the whole population, including the Amazigh activists, have Arab names. However, they inform 
us that they take Amazigh nicknames (Appendix 2: ll. 469-470). We view this small act of 
resistance as their own way of navigating the law. By taking an Amazigh name they closely link 
their cultural heritage on to their person and become a reminder of their culture and cause. This is 
another way to achieve visibility.   
Here it is useful for us to include De Certeau’s theory of strategies and tactics. In this case, 
the law made by the power instance, which is the Moroccan government, is a strategy to maintain 
the arabization of Morocco. Then, the Amazigh being the weak, navigate the law by using a 
tactic. They use the tactic of taking Amazigh nicknames and thus maneuvering the action carried 
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out to assimilate them. By doing it this way, they do not break any laws but still claim their 
cultural names as an act of resistance, hence undermining the strategy that was made to arabize 
them. 
Once again, one of the main reasons why they wish to educate and enlighten others is to gain 
visibility. As seen with their workshops for example, they teach women how to vote so that they 
can involve themselves in politics. As previously mentioned, gender equality is a crucial part of 
Amazigh culture so naturally they want to involve women and these educational workshops is 
one thing they do to achieve this. 
Another point which the activists emphasize is that they wish to reach out to younger 
generations and inform them of their cultural struggles. They wish to build a: “new consciousness 
about our history, our culture, our rights (...)“ (Appendix 1: ll. 103-105). As already mentioned 
they wish to change the discourse of Amazigh, and one of the ways to do this is to inform and 
educate people. That is why it is so important for them to become visible. 
We as researchers also experienced first hand their urge to share their knowledge, both Kejji 
and the subjects of the group interview being very informative. They knew a lot about their 
culture, history and rights and they were able to recite a lot of different statistics in order to make 
their points clear and scientific. They provided us with both books, internet links and names of 
experts that they wanted us to study. It was evident that they wanted to promote and teach their 
culture and they used us as a tool to achieve this.  
We also noticed that they underlined the importance it has that their cause becomes evident 
to Europe. This was mentioned in relation to the terrorist attack in Belgium. The activists 
informed us that the terrorists were of Amazigh origin, but it was the lack of cultural recognition, 
said Thiyya, that resulted in the radicalisation of the Amazigh terrorists. The activists said that the 
same happens as ISIS recruits Amazigh soldiers for the war in Syria. Therefore, the activist argue 
that if Europe has an interest in stopping the radicalization, the way to accomplish this is to 
support and promote the Amazigh culture (Appendix 2: ll. 214-217).  
 
9.3.6. Media 
Different aspects of the media function as both a great tool but also as quite a problem for the 
Amazigh. According to the activists, even though there is an Amazigh TV channel, there is no 
information about Imazighen on the normal channels. The demonstration we attended had as one 
purpose to raise awareness about the problems that earthquakes had caused to  Imazighen in the 
north of Morocco as this matter had not been referenced on the national channels (Appendix 5: ll. 
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104-127). On the other hand, social media has opened a whole new world of possibilities. The 
activists, especially Kejji, uses Facebook very much to spread news and to promote their cause. 
Kejji was waiting for the train with us when we asked why he had three phones. He then pointed 
to the phone he was holding at the moment and said: “This is my weapon” (ibid.: l. 69). In this 
example, we can again see that it is very important for them to become visible not only in 
Morocco but in other countries as well. As Weitzman states “Marginalized minorities often seek 
to internationalize their struggles, and the Amazigh are no exception, albeit with limited effects.” 
(Maddy-Weitzman 2015: p. 11). 
The phone truly is his weapon. He shared pictures and posts about the Amazigh cause 
continuously during our stay and many of these photos and posts revolved around us. He posted 
pictures from the first interview, from the day we visited him and ate Tajine (traditional 
Moroccan/Amazigh food) and from the group interview. In the end of the group interview we 
held a few moments of silence for the victims of terror in Belgium and he took pictures during 
this time and posted them. All in all he posted approximately 20 photos with us during the three 
days we spent together. In the first picture he wrote in Arabic (as we do not speak Arabic, we rely 
solely on the translations suggested by google’s translator function) that our project was called: 
“Amazigh from cultural to political awareness” (Appendix 6: picture 1). As we had not said that 
it was our project’s name, the choice of words seems to be Kejji's. He even mentioned in the first 
interview that they are trying to move from a cultural fight to a political one (Appendix 1: ll. 57-
58). In this way, he makes it seem like we are also fighting his fight. The young activists also 
seemed to have very high expectations of our contribution to their fight for visibility when we 
returned to Denmark. One activist explained:  
“Because we are just students, and some activists, we don't have a power. We did only 
our own efforts, so we need many help and many support from like this kind of 
collaboration and we need also that our idea and our voice to be known in Europe.” 
(Appendix 2: ll. 171-173) 
Globalization and social media were also often pointed out by the activists as the reason we (as 
researchers) were even able to come and talk with them. And in fact, this is true as we first 
contacted Kejji over the internet and were able to fly to Morocco with a cheap airline company, 
both factors contributing to globalization. 
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9.3.7. The tactics of the Amazigh  
We find it useful to include de Certeau to understand how the Amazigh activists use different 
tactics to maneuver the strategies enforced by the state. Previously, we have examined 
segregation and assimilation as being two major strategies that the state handles in order to 
control the population.  
As mentioned before, the state tries to assimilate the Amazigh minority by arabizing them. 
They use different direct measures to accomplish that, as the recently mentioned measure of 
forbidding Amazigh names. In response to this strategy, the Amazigh activists used a tactic that 
navigated the law in a way they were able to take names that maintained their cultural identity. 
However, they also used other tactics to combat the strategies of arabization laid out by the state. 
We perceive every act of making their culture visible as a tactic that fights the arabization. The 
state tries to manipulate the population into Arabism and they fight back by for example 
expressing themselves in Tamazight and making their Amazigh culture more visible. They do 
this by hosting demonstrations, using the media to spread their message and engaging themselves 
in little communities with culture clubs and workshops.    
The other strategy that we mentioned is the one of segregation. The state separates the 
population into different geographic regions in order to dominate social classes. To this point, 
Kejji mentions that the Amazigh people living in the mountains are incredibly poor and live 
under almost inhuman conditions. In this way, this part of the population is so excluded of 
society that they have no voice. When they are silenced like this, it becomes easier to control or 
ignore them. The Amazigh activists seem to be aware of this and a big part of their work actually 
concerns these people. For instance, the demonstration we attended was held to raise awareness 
of an earthquake that struck a rural area that, according to the activists, caused many casualties. 
However, the mainstream media never covered this incident and we believe that the lack of 
coverage can be seen as a strategy that aims to maintain the social inequalities so that the rural 
population can be easily manipulated.  
Because of this, the activists counterattacked this strategy by hosting a demonstration that 
informs the public of the earthquake and the conditions of the people in the rural areas. It is an 
example of Imazighen from higher social classes that help the poor Imazighen from the rural 
areas that do not posses a voice to speak for themselves. They try to bridge the social gap 
between rich and poor and it combats the segregation enforced by the state. It is a tactic that 
counteracts the strategy of segregation carried out by the state. 
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In conclusion, our investigation has pointed out a wide variety of tools that are used by the 
Amazigh movement. They use historical events to create a narrative of their own culture that 
claims universalized ideas (as seen with gender) as their own. They practice their native language 
which helps to change the discourse of Amazigh while gaining public visibility. They also 
achieve this by educating and enlightening the public with the aim of reaching the next 
generation of Moroccans and the outside world (especially the Western society). Also, their 
culture is evident in their lifestyle as activists and this helps them spread their cause. Likewise, 
they use the media, and in relation to this, Kejji’s smartphone illustrates his modern weapon of 
choice. And finally, we came to the conclusion that we as researchers were used as pillars of 
advertisement and were therefore also important tools in the Amazigh struggle for political and 
cultural recognition.  
 
10. DISCUSSION 
In this section we will discuss how the Amazigh activists use their culture as a resource in their 
political fight based on our research and analytical points. We will debate the activists 
argumentation and point out where we find it to be contradictory or shortcoming. 
Lastly, we wish to discuss if the activists actually do have the capability to change the situation of 
the Imazighen people of Morocco. 
Universalized values like cultural diversity, human rights, gender equality and especially 
democracy and secularism are the values that the Amazigh activist we interviewed kept relating 
to.  
However, when they mention their sympathy for the oppressed inhabitants of Morocco, their 
sympathy seems to be strictly dedicated to those of Amazigh origin. They did not comment on 
the less wealthy Arabs even when asked directly about this matter. In this way, they themselves 
segregate their own ethnicity from the Arab one, and this ends up being opposite to the 
universalized idea of multiculturalism. This is a contradiction in their debate as they say one 
thing but exercise something else. In consequence, it weakens their argumentation as they 
exclude the Arab culture while preaching multiculturalism. As Cornwell and Atia also point out, 
they are forced into a “double movement” caught between inclusivity and uniqueness (Cornwell 
& Atia 2012: p. 260). 
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The attempt to unite their people under the banner of one single ethnic group brings us to the 
second paradox of the activists’ argumentation. We noticed a discordance between Islam and 
secularism within the Amazigh community’s ideologies. One of the participants of the group 
interview, whom we called Ijju, was veiled and informed us that she was both Muslim and 
Amazigh. As several of the other interviewees, she explained that the Amazigh culture welcomes 
religious and ethnic diversity, and she states that their culture does not have a specific religious 
tie. However, we observed that Ijju was often almost silenced as she turned out to be a 
disturbance to the others’ attempt to unify and essentialize a gathered understanding of what it 
meant to be Amazigh. 
In addition to that, Kejji often stated that the fundamental Islamists were their enemy and that 
Islamic values stood in the way of secularism in society. Therefore, Ijju might disrupt the idea 
about secularism and the Amazighs’ efforts to link their culture to universalized Western ideas. 
Instead of keeping Ijju and others like her silenced we believe that they could have used her case 
as a tool to emphasize their inclusion of the Islamic religion. In this way the Amazigh activists 
would demonstrate that they are in fact open to multiculturalism and the Muslim Imazighen.  
As mentioned in the analysis, we were considered to be representatives of the European 
interests by the Amazigh movement. It proved that their use of media had worked. Therefore, 
they perceived us as a potential tool to promote their cause in a European context. This raised 
new questions about our roles as researchers and refers to our methodological considerations in 
the beginning of this project. One of our presumptions about our fieldwork was that we as 
outsiders would find it difficult to get under the skin of the Amazigh culture and enter the field. 
However, we found it to be completely opposite in the way that the movement saw us as an 
opportunity to be heard and therefore gladly welcomed our interest in their struggle. 
     We felt embarrassed that they treated us as having a major influence on European politics 
when we are in fact students from a university in Denmark with low to non-impact on 
governmental policies. Nevertheless, it was interesting to see how we were treated as journalists 
or scholars and had to listen to facts and numbers, as if the activists had rehearsed certain phrases 
and one-liners. This meant that our data collection was affected by the activist’s view of what we 
represented rather than how we see ourselves.  
In the group we discussed our own position during the fieldwork and found it to be rather 
beneficial. We were treated as representatives of European recognition and therefore it seemed 
like we received official political statements from the Amazigh activists. It was them who 
positioned us in this way but we actually found it to be fruitful in answering our problem 
formulation thoroughly. We think that it helped us because it established a setting of a political 
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dialogue where the rhetorics of the interviews was adapted to such a setting. It was clear how 
they used and connected Amazigh culture to their political goals and that is what we wanted to 
examine. On the other hand we were not able to gain knowledge about the more personal 
background of the activists which could have contributed to the deeper understanding of their 
statements and positions. 
Our position in the field functions as a tool for the Amazigh to promote their cultural and 
political goals was influenced, not only by the way that the activists saw and treated us, but also 
by the data we were able to obtain from them. By writing this project about the Amazigh we are 
not merely describing their culture we are also conserving and even creating it. 
One question that emerged while studying the Amazigh movement was about the prospects 
of their struggle which lead us to the question: do the activists actually have the potential to 
change the situation? 
As concluded in the earlier sections the paramount objective of their activism is democracy. 
They have the understanding that achieving democracy will automatically bring them a lot closer 
to achieving their other major goals such as gender equality, human rights and secularism. As 
Europeans we perceive these ideas as fundamental to our understanding of what a society should 
be. However, our research in Morocco has shown us a different part of the world and De 
Certeau’s terms of strategies and tactics have helped us to understand the processes that the state 
uses to control the population and how the population counters this manipulation. 
As previously mentioned, the state uses the strategies of assimilation to arabize their people 
and it segregates the social classes into different areas to keep them under control. In addition to 
this, our interviewees also inform us of strategies such as media’s censoring (as seen with the 
purpose of the demonstration), religion as a tool to dominate and the portrayal of the Amazigh as 
“Berbers” and folkloric people used solely for touristic purposes. Based on our research, we have 
come to the understanding that these strategies are effective in the fight between the activists and 
the Moroccan state. In fact, they are so powerful that the activists can only take small steps in 
changing the situation. 
They take these steps by counteracting the strategies of the state with tactics. Tactics such as 
making their cause and culture visible by engaging themselves in the local communities, 
speaking Tamazight publicly and fighting segregation by highlighting the issues of the rural 
areas. However, when contrasting these strategies in relation to the tactics, the latter are inferior. 
The power of the state is so superior that the tactics can only be performed at a basic level. 
Nonetheless, they are not completely powerless. Our studies indicate that some of their tactics do 
have an impact in changing the situation. 
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First of all, we have noticed a positive progress with the Tamazight language. According to 
one of our interviewees, people were considered fools if they spoke Tamazight just 10 years ago. 
Now, the discourse of the language seems to have changed and we observe and analysed different 
reasons for this. On a political level it has been recognized as an official language and script, and 
that definitely adds to a sort of verification in social context also. Also, the activists practice 
Tamazight publicly and that makes the language visible which is an intention in itself.   
Being visible is another tool that we found to prove effective. We can see this evidently when 
we examine the activists’ use of media as for example Facebook. Kejji has a lot of followers and 
it is a good way to show that the activists are working actively, while it also promotes their cause 
and helps recruiting new members. We find that the use of media is a strong tool as it can also 
help them reaching out internationally which is also an objective they often emphasize. 
Meanwhile, it is also important to gain visibility physically. They do this by creating 
organisations that host workshops or demonstrations and by having these cultural meetings they 
also constitute themselves as a culture and as a community. We attended one of these 
demonstrations and it is difficult to say whether or not it had a real impact on the situation of the 
Amazigh population. People were yelling informative messages and showing the symbols of the 
Amazigh, but it was limited to the one square in Rabat where it took place and we did not notice 
any media coverage. Other, larger demonstrations may stimulate visibility and public awareness. 
As they organize themselves in groups or organisations they become a minority and, as 
previously stated, they become marginalized by the power holders. A tool they use to escape this 
marginalization is identifying their culture with universalised values and ideas. These values and 
ideas stand in opposition to the ones of the state and we find that it is very important for the 
activists to separate themselves from the ideologies that are fundamental to an Arab society (as 
they describe them).  
We have stated that this is a tool, and we believe it to be a powerful one. When we came to 
Morocco to conduct our research we instantly felt sympathy towards their cause as they fight for 
ideas that are fundamental to our European understanding of how a fair system and government 
should be. We believe that most Westerners will feel this way and therefore sympathize with 
their struggle. This, together with visibility, could be one reason why the Amazigh activists are 
focusing on researchers and journalists. It is one of their main objectives to get the attention of 
the West and we can see that in the way they use us. About this, we sensed that Kejji was aware 
of the potential we possessed even before we arrived in Morocco.  
In conclusion, we have found that the activists are able to change the existing structures to 
some extent, but in most cases the strategies of the state are too powerful to come around. 
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11. CONCLUSION        
In this project we have chosen to investigate how Amazigh activists use their culture as a 
resource in their political fight. To answer this question we travelled to Morocco to collect our 
data through participatory observations and qualitative semi-structured interviews with Amazigh 
activists. To analyse the collected data we used Eriksen’s book “Ethnicity and Nationalism” and 
the terms tactics and strategies as defined by De Certeau. These two theoretical approaches have 
helped us to find patterns in our data material. Apart from this, we have used principles from 
grounded theory to code our data material and to find more patterns. We have analyzed these 
patterns and based on this, we have been able to formulate some tools which are utilized by the 
activists to achieve their goals.  
We found out that the Amazigh activists did use their culture in many different ways as a 
resource in their political fight. Their political goals are in general what would be characterized 
as universalized Western ideas such as democracy, secularism, human rights, cultural diversity, 
gender equality and freedom of religious choice. In order to make the universalized principles 
specific for the Amazigh identity they highlighted a historical narrative that connected these 
values to their culture. They saw democracy as the paramount factor to achieve the remaining 
political goals.  
When asked to define Amazigh culture the activists often criticised the fact that the 
government seems to define their culture as folklore and only use it for economic purposes. This 
economic exploitation, the segregation and the attempted arabization made the Amazigh activists 
feel and define themselves as marginalized. They also used the Arabic and Islamic culture to 
highlight their problems and to make the rhetorics clear and understandable. In this manner they 
stereotyped the Arabs with some negative tendencies. Furthermore, they also defined themselves 
against the Arab culture and sometimes even Islam. These rhetorics created a somewhat implicit 
“us and them” relation and therefore a problem of exclusion.  
To achieve their political goals they used a large variety of tools. The Amazigh history is 
used to explain how universalized values are linked with their culture. The activists speak the 
Tamazight language and use this as an act of resistance towards the dominating culture and to 
change the common discourse of Tamazight as a stigmatized language. They also use symbols to 
gain visibility and some degree of unity. 
They seek to promote and make the Amazigh culture visible through agitation and  
education. In addition to this, social media is an important tool in their political fight especially to 
obtain visibility. Facebook is used to gain new followers and international attention. We, as 
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researchers and Europeans, were also used as a way of gaining visibility, as pictures of us were 
shared and liked abundantly on Facebook. 
We have thus in this project provided specific knowledge about how the Amazigh activists in 
Morocco use different aspects from their culture as tools to reach political goals.  
 
12. PERSPECTIVATION       
We could have moved in many different directions from our initial interest in the Amazigh 
people of Morocco. We choose to elaborate on a very narrow selection of these directions in this 
section. We would like to briefly present how we could have worked with identity formation of 
the activists on a more individual basis and how we could have delved deeper into the subject of 
gender equality.  
We could have gone further into the matter of how the identities of the activists were 
constructed in relation to society and to the group they had situated themselves in. This would 
create a focus on the individual, in contrast to the focus on the group we have had in the project. 
How does joining an Amazigh organization influence the formation of an individual’s identity? 
In this connection, it could have been interesting to take a closer look on how the activists 
performed their identity. For example, Ijju said:  
“I have to know about my identity. I have to know how to present my identity to others 
because here I might learn or require some skills or tools to present all what I have to 
others.” (Appendix 2: 253-255).  
In this quote we see the importance of having an identity to perform to other people. We could 
have asked her more specifically how she wanted to present herself, and which elements she 
found important to highlight. When we visited Kejji at his house it struck us how evident 
Amazigh activism was everywhere in his home, manifested in for example posters, books and an 
Amazigh flag. There were also many objects from different cultures on display, for example a 
christmas tree, and in this way he performed diversity and multiculturalism as a part of his 
identity.   
As described in both the analysis and the discussion we also got the impression that the 
activists were performing their identity in order to present their cause clearly to us as researchers. 
It could have proved interesting to observe how other activists (apart from Kejji) perform their 
identity to others. This could have been done using participatory observation, as in the case with 
Kejji, when we went to visit him.  
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The activists also used heroic figures as idols which seemed to be an important aspect of 
their identity construction. Prominent Amazigh activists and artists, old Amazigh legends from 
their history and even Kejji were idolized by the young activists of the group interview. Also, 
there seemed to be a certain tendency to highlight some of the deceased activists as martyrs. It 
could have been interesting to examine which specific characteristics the activists admire and use 
in their own construction of their identities. These admired characteristics could have told us 
something about the general ideals in the Amazigh culture.  
We could have gone further regarding the question of gender equality, which we in the 
project touched briefly in relation to, for example, how the queen Kahina is used in a narrative to 
empower women. In our research we found a book called “Moroccan Feminist Discourses” 
(Sadiqi 2014) which would have been extremely helpful in this endeavor. She argues that the 
existing feminist discourses in Morocco could be enriched by involving an Amazigh perspective. 
She continues to argue that the historicity of Amazigh women could be used in a higher degree to 
empower women. By having stories about women with agency, women of today get a bigger 
opportunity of positive identity formation. This relates to the use of heroes as well. If we had the 
opportunity, we could have conducted interviews and participatory observations with this in 
mind. In our project we have investigated how Amazigh activists use their identity as a resource 
in their political fight, but we could have made the project more specific and looked at how the 
historical narrative specific to the Amazigh culture could help empower women. To do this, 
Sadiqi’s book and terms would have been very helpful. 
Finally, we will briefly explain how the project contributes to a broader scientific field. The 
framework of the project and our choice of method enables us to conduct and analyse a very 
specific area; our niche in the broader field.  
Our project is helping to understand the work and methods used by the interviewed Amazigh 
activists to gain political power and influence as well as to be able to spread their message within 
and across national borders. At the same time this project is an inspiration for other students to 
conduct their own fieldwork by giving them information about what to consider prior to and 
during the data collection, especially when working in a foreign culture.  
The results we gained are a support for the research that has been carried out before. At the 
same time other scholars’ work also back up our results. The method we chose and the fact that 
we analysed a very specific part of the Amazigh movement strengthens this project’s relevance 
and gives an inside view of the movements’ activism.  
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